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A PROPOSED CHECK ON THE CHARGING
DISCRETION OF WISCONSIN PROSECUTORS
With the emergence of the increasingly vocal victims' rights movement
and a more general punitive emphasis in criminal justice, the issue of prosecu-
torial discretion in the decision of whether to charge a suspect with a crime has
assumed paramount importance. In two recent cases the Wisconsin Supreme
Court addressed the fundamental question of whether it is the responsibility of
the local prosecutor or the court to charge a suspect with a crime. This Comment
examines these two cases, Unnamed Petitioners v. Connors, decided in 1987,
and State v. Unnamed Defendant, decided in 1989. The Comment concludes
that the charging mechanism upheld by the court comports neither with the
modern practical necessity of having the charging decision reside with prose-
cutors nor with traditional Wisconsin separation of powers doctrine. The author
suggests a new charging means, one that ensures greater prosecutorial account-
ability for charging decisions and involves the judiciary in the review of in-
stances of prosecutorial inaction. This method, the author argues, is consistent
with separation of powers doctrine and the practical realities of modem prose-
cution, and provides crime victims a critically important avenue of redress in
the event a prosecutor unjustifiably refuses to charge.
I. INTRODUCTION
It is an axiom of modem criminal justice administration that the
public prosecutor wields enormous discretion in deciding whether to
charge a suspect with a crime.I Commentators have recognized this
power for some time. Newman Baker, writing in 1935, noted:
[T]he initiation of criminal prosecution is a matter resting in
the uncontrolled discretion of the prosecuting attorney. To
prosecute or not to prosecute? The answer rests upon his in-
dividual desires, dependent upon his character, remotely af-
fected by the force of public opinion, but not subject to legal
control except in the extreme instances of official miscon-
duct.2
1. "Charging" is used here to mean the initial decision to accuse a suspect with a
crime and hence involve that suspect in the criminal justice system. In Wisconsin, the charging
decision centers on the issuance of a criminal complaint, generally by the local district at-
tomey. See infra notes 146-48 and accompanying text. The decision to file a complaint is
distinguishable from subsequent decisions also within the rubric of "charging," including the
number and type of offenses contained in an indictment or information. These latter decisions
are beyond the scope of this Comment.
2. Baker, The Prosecuting Attorney: Legal Aspects of the Office, 26 J. AM. INST.
CRIM. L. & CIMINOLOGY 647, 647-48 (1935). See also Jackson, The Federal Prosecutor, 24
J. AM. JUD. Soc'Y 18 (1940) ("The prosecutor has more control over life, liberty and rep-
utation than any other person in America. His discretion is tremendous").
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The history of the American prosecutor has been characterized by a
virtually unquestioned accretion of discretionary power. This unfet-
tered growth is particularly notable in light of concerted efforts directed
toward limiting discretion exercised by other criminal justice interests,
especially the police and the courts.3
This growth, however, has recently come into question. In re-
sponse to the increasingly powerful and vocal victims' rights move-
ment,4 numerous states have provided procedures to increase the in-
volvement of crime victims in the criminal prosecutions of their alleged
offenders.5 These efforts have largely been directed at giving victims a
greater voice in proceedings subsequent to the commencement of the
criminal prosecution. 6 Today, however, there is increasing pressure to
involve crime victims in the decision regarding whether to institute
criminal actions at all.7 Indeed, a number of states have procedures
3. See Vorenberg, Decent Restraint of Prosecutorial Power, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1521,
1525 (1981).
4. Of the victims' rights movement, Justice Abrahamson of the Wisconsin Supreme
Court has said: "The victims' rights movement presents an alternative blueprint for the
criminal justice system.... [A]doption of the changes advocated by the movement could
significantly restructure our present criminal justice system, giving the victim a systematic
influence from investigation and arrest through parole." Abrahamson, Redefining Roles: The
Victims' Rights Movement, 1985 UTAH L. REV. 517, 518. "[T]he movement's basic theme
can be summarized as a privatization of the concept of criminal justice. It demands that the
personal interest of the victim be considered within the criminal justice system." Id. at 519.
In general, the movement derives from a growing erosion of trust in the ability of the justice
system to dispense justice effectively in individual instances. See Goldstein, Defining the Role
of the Victim in Criminal Prosecution, 52 Miss. L.J. 515, 518 (1982). For a helpful overview
of the historical decline of victims in criminal prosecutions, see McDonald, Towards a Bi-
centenial Revolution in Criminal Justice: The Return of the Victim, 13 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
649, 651-61 (1976).
5. As of 1984, 14 states, including Wisconsin, had a "Victims' Bill of Rights,"
which provides crime victims a right to information, notice and participation in criminal
proceedings. Kelly, Victims'Perceptions of Criminal Justice, 11 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 15, 21-
22 (1984). Wisconsin's version, the first in the nation, is codified at Wis. STAT. § 950.04
(1989-1990). A recent manifestation of the concern over victims' rights is the enactment of
constitutional amendments to ensure that victims have a role in the criminal justice process.
In 1989 alone four states took such a measure, bringing the national total to five. See FLA.
CONST. art. I, § 16(b); MICH. CONST. art. I, § 24; TEX. CONST. art. I, § 30; WASH. CONST.
art. I, § 30). (Rhode Island passed an amendment in 1986; see R.I. CONST. art. I, § 23.) A
constitutional amendment regarding victims' rights is also to be introduced in the 1991
Wisconsin legislative session. The amendment would elevate to constitutional status the
extant victims' bill of rights and also ensure victims the right to confer with the prosecution
and to be present at all proceedings the accused is entitled to attend. Conversation with Steve
Derene, Office of Crime Victims Services, Wisconsin Department of Justice. Conversation
transcript on file with author.
6. Wisconsin, for instance, provides that victims have the right to be informed of
the final disposition of their cases (Wis. STAT. § 950.04(1) (1989-1990)); to provide the court
with information regarding the economic, physical and psychological effects of their victim-
ization and to have the information considered by the court (Wis. STAT. § 950.04(2m) (1989-
1990)); and to make a statement to the court prior to sentencing (Wis. STAT. § 972.14(3)
(1989-1990)).
7. Such a view makes eminent sense given that without commencement of the
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that provide victims a direct role in the charging decision.8 Moreover,
while commentators have for some time urged that victims be provided
a means to contest a prosecutor's decision not to prosecute, 9 the last
two years have witnessed a burgeoning of this advocacy. 10
In the wake of two recent decisions by the Wisconsin Supreme
Court, the charging power of prosecutors has assumed particular im-
portance in Wisconsin. The decisions, Unnamed Petitioners v.
Connors" and State v. Unnamed Defendant, 12 evince markedly differ-
ent views of the power of prosecutors in charging criminal suspects. In
Connors, decided in 1987, the court found unconstitutional for sepa-
ration of powers reasons Wisconsin Statutes section 968.02(3), a law
passed in 1969 that permits a circuit judge to file a criminal complaint
if the district attorney refuses or is unavailable to do so.' 3 Unnamed
criminal proceeding there can be no conviction, and with no conviction, there can be no
sentence. The decision to prosecute is distinct from the refusal to do so, for reasons other
than ultimate outcome. Affirmative decisions to prosecute have historically been subject to
extensive judicial scrutiny. Selective prosecution based on race, religion or other arbitrary
classification has been disallowed on constitutional grounds for some time. Yick Wo v.
Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886). Similarly, a prosecutor may not, consistent with the consti-
tution, use the charging power to penalize a suspect for exercising constitutional rights. Black-
ledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21 (1974). This involvement by the courts historically has been absent
with regard to refusals to charge. See infra notes 160-75 and accompanying text. See also K.
DAvis, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 22 (1969) ("the power not to
prosecute may be of greater magnitude than the power to prosecute, and it certainly [has
been] much more abused because it is so little [controlled]").
8. See infra notes 176-79 and accompanying text.
9. See, e.g., Comment, Private Prosecution: A Remedy For District Attorneys' Un-
warranted Inaction, 65 YALE L.J. 209 (1955); Comment, Legal Methods For the Suppression
of Organized Crime: Circumventing the Corrupt Prosecutor, 48 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY &
POLICE ScI. 531 (1958) [hereinafter Circumventing the Corrupt Prosecutor].
10. See, e.g., Note, The Constitutional Validity of Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal
Procedure 133(b)(2) and The Traditional Role of the Pennsylvania Courts in the Prosecutorial
Function, 52 U. PITT. L. REV. 269 (1990) (arguing that the judiciary be provided with ex-
tensive powers to review prosecutorial inaction); Davis, The Crime Victim's "Right" To A
Criminal Prosecution: A Proposed Model Statute for the Governance of Private Criminal
Prosecutions, 38 DE PAUL L. REV. 329 (1989) (suggesting that victims be able to retain private
counsel in times of inaction); Note, Private Challenges to Prosecutorial Inaction: A Model
Declaratory Judgment Statute, 97 YALE L.J. 488 (1988) (suggesting that a court be able to
review a prosecutor's decision not to prosecute and, upon finding that the decision constituted
an abuse of discretion, issue a declaratory judgment to "signal" the wrongful decision); Com-
ment, Judicially Initiated Prosecution: A Means of Preventing Continuing Victimization in
the Event of Prosecutorial Inaction, 76 CALIF. L. REV. 727 (1988) (victims suffering ongoing
threat of harm should be able to petition the court to appoint a private attorney to prosecute
the case when the state refuses to prosecute).
11. 136 Wis. 2d 118, 401 N.W.2d 782 (1987).
12. 150 Wis. 2d 352, 441 N.W.2d 696 (1989).
13. Connors, 136 Wis. 2d at 143, 401 N.W.2d at 782. Wis. STAT. § 968.02 (1989-
1990) provides:
(1) Except as otherwise provided in this section, a complaint charging a person with
an offense shall be issued only by a district attorney of the county where the crime
is alleged to have been committed. A complaint is issued when it is approved for
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Defendant, handed down only two years later and, like Connors, written
by Chief Justice Heffernan, reversed Connors.14 In Unnamed Defend-
ant, the court considered the constitutionality of Wisconsin Statutes
section 968.26, a law predating the state constitution that technically
allows citizens to request circuit judges to issue criminal complaints
without any involvement by local prosecutors. 5 The Unnamed De-
fendant court held that because section 968.26 had existed prior to the
adoption of the state constitution, the statute was necessarily consti-
tutional. To resolve the conflict with Connors, the court reversed Con-
nors and deemed section 968.02(3) constitutional as well.
Aside from representing a rare about-face on a matter of consti-
tutional significance, the opinions reveal an intriguing conflict over the
proper locus of the charging function, an issue of fundamental impor-
tance in modem criminal justice administration. The purpose of this
Comment is to examine, in the wake of Connors and Unnamed De-
fendant, the propriety of the mechanisms Wisconsin now uses to control
discretion in the prosecution decision. In particular, the Comment ar-
gues that the Unnamed Defendant court arrived at essentially the right
conclusion, but for the wrong reasons. The courts do indeed have a
role to play in the charging decision, but this conclusion does not derive
from a static historical analysis like that employed by the Unnamed
Defendant court. Rather, consideration of traditional Wisconsin sep-
aration of powers principles and the practical realities of the modem
justice system compels this conclusion. Use of the correct interpretive
framework would have led the Unnamed Defendant court to invalidate
the charging controls it ultimately upheld; the system does not comport
with separation of powers doctrine and is based on an unrealistic un-
derstanding of contemporary prosecutorial needs and practices.
filing by the district attorney. The approval shall be in the form of a written en-
dorsement on the complaint.
(2) After a complaint has been issued, it shall be filed with a judge and either
a warrant or summons shall be issued or the complaint shall be dismissed, pursuant
to s. 968.03. Such filing commences the action.
(3) If a district attorney refuses or is unavailable to issue a complaint, a circuit
judge may permit the filing of a complaint, if the judge finds there is probable cause
to believe that the person to be charged has committed an offense after conducting
a hearing. If the district attorney has refused to issue a complaint, he or she shall
be informed of the hearing and may attend. The hearing shall be ex parte without
the right of cross-examination.
14. Unnamed Defendant, 150 Wis. 2d at 365, 441 N.W.2d at 701.
15. WIs. STAT. § 968.26 (1989-1990) provides as follows:
If a person complains to a judge that he has reason to believe that a crime has been
committed within his jurisdiction, the judge shall examine the complainant under
oath and any witnesses produced.... If it appears probable from the testimony
given that a crime has been committed and who committed it, the complaint shall
be reduced to writing and signed and verified; and thereupon a warrant shall issue
for the arrest of the accused....
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Part II of the Comment presents the background and reasoning of
the Connors and Unnamed Defendant opinions. Part III criticizes the
historical and constitutional analyses of the Unnamed Defendant court,
finding them misconceived and ill-suited to modem separation of pow-
ers requirements. The charging decision and the role of public prose-
cutors in the criminal justice system have changed dramatically since
the state's origin. A correct constitutional interpretation by the court
would recognize that charging in contemporary Wisconsin is primarily,
but not exclusively, the job of prosecutors, and that controls on this
power are needed. However, the controls approved in Unnamed De-
fendant are inadequately tailored to the modem distribution of powers
between the executive and the judiciary. Part IV discusses the need for
a check on the prosecution decision and considers the current avenues
of recourse available to Wisconsin citizens in response to prosecutorial
inaction. Part V criticizes these existing controls for practical reasons,
as well as for their fundamental constitutional infirmities. The Com-
ment concludes with a proposal to replace current charging controls.
The new approach is more consonant with Wisconsin separation of
powers doctrine, striking a balance between the institutional demands
of the criminal justice system and the needs of crime victims when the
system unduly fails to prosecute.
II. BACKGROUND
The issue ofjudicial encroachment on the charging powers of Wis-
consin prosecutors first came into question in Unnamed Petitioners v.
Connors. 16 In Connors, a victim of sexual assault requested that a crim-
inal complaint issue against her alleged assailants. After an investiga-
tion, the district attorney for Milwaukee County elected not to file a
complaint, not on the basis of a lack of probable cause, but on his
perceived inability to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt at trial.17
After the district attorney's refusal to prosecute, and upon the
petition of the complainant, the matter was assigned to a circuit judge
pursuant to Wisconsin Statutes section 968.02(3). This section pro-
vides, in part, that "[i]f a district attorney refuses or is unavailable to
issue a complaint, a circuit judge may permit the filing of a complaint,
if the judge finds there is probable cause to believe that the person to
be charged has committed an offense after conducting a hearing."' 8 The
alleged assailants then sought a writ of prohibition from the Wisconsin
16. 136 Wis. 2d 118, 401 N.W.2d 782 (1987).
17. Id. at 123, 401 N.W.2d at 784 (quoting State ex rel. Newspapers, Inc. v. Circuit
Court for Milwaukee County, 124 Wis. 2d 409, 502, 307 N.W.2d 209, 211 (1985)).
18. Wis. STAT. § 968.02(3) (1989-1990).
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Supreme Court, arguing that the statute unconstitutionally violated
Wisconsin's separation of powers doctrine. 19
The Connors court granted the writ, finding that the statute im-
properly vested the judiciary with powers constitutionally residing with
prosecutors, members of the executive branch.20 The court first re-
viewed case law that "has repeatedly held that the discretion to charge
or not to charge, and the discretion of how to charge, rests solely with
the district attorney." 2' The court then scrutinized the complaint is-
suance procedure contained in Wisconsin Statutes section 968.02(3).
According to the court, the practical effect of the statute was to allow
a circuit court to initiate prosecution ab initio: to construct its own
factual record and make a charging determination upon either prose-
cutorial refusal or absence. 22 Because the procedure amounted to a
"complete usurpation ... of an important executive function by the
judiciary," the Connors court found that the section unconstitutionally
violated separation of powers doctrine.23
In State v. Unnamed Defendant,24 decided only two years later,
the Wisconsin Supreme Court again confronted the question of the
scope of prosecutorial powers in the charging decision. In Unnamed
Defendant, the Waukesha County district attorney's office refused to
issue a complaint in response to an alleged sexual assault.25 The stated
reason for the refusal was a potential ethical problem. Members of the
office knew both the complainant and the suspect.26 An assistant district
attorney for Dane County was therefore summoned and appointed
acting district attorney for the county pursuant to Wisconsin Statutes
section 59.44, which authorizes the district attorney or circuit judge to
make such provisional appointments. 27 The acting prosecutor reviewed
the investigative file and decided not to pursue criminal proceedings,
believing that he could not establish the suspect's guilt beyond a rea-
sonable doubt.28
The complainant, mindful of the recent Connors decision regard-
ing Wisconsin Statutes section 968.02(3), then sought to commence
19. Connors, 136 Wis. 2d at 123, 401 N.W.2d at 784.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 128, 401 N.W.2d at 786.
22. Id. at 142, 401 N.W.2d at 792.
23. Id. at 143, 401 N.W.2d at 792.
24. 150 Wis. 2d 352, 441 N.W.2d 696 (1989).
25. Id. at 356, 441 N.W.2d at 679.
26. Id.
27. WIs. STAT. § 59.44 (1988-1989) (repealed effective January 1, 1990). See infra
note 249.
28. Unnamed Defendant, 150 Wis. 2d at 356, 441 N.W.2d at 697.
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prosecution by means of section 968.26, the "John Doe" statute. 29 This
statute provides that a citizen may approach a circuit court judge with
information relating to an alleged crime and that the court may issue
a complaint and arrest warrant upon finding probable cause that a crime
was committed. 30 On the basis of testimony elicited by a special pros-
ecutor, the circuit court filed a criminal complaint against the defend-
ant. The defendant moved to have the action dismissed on the ground
that section 968.26, like the statute at issue in Connors, unconstitu-
tionally vested executive powers in the judiciary. The circuit court
denied the defendant's motion to dismiss, the court of appeals certified
the matter to the supreme court and the latter accepted certification. 31
The Unnamed Defendant court held that the charging component
of the John Doe proceeding did not constitute a violation of executive
powers by the judiciary.32 In so holding, the court overruled the premise
of Connors-namely, that initiation of criminal prosecutions is an ex-
clusive executive power in Wisconsin. The court based its decision on
newly presented historical evidence indicating that criminal prosecu-
tions in general, and John Doe proceedings in particular, had been the
responsibility of the courts from the origin of Wisconsin's constitution
until recent times.33 According to the court, the provision authorizing
initiation of criminal prosecutions by John Doe proceedings was in
force in 1848 when the Wisconsin Constitution was first adopted.34 The
statutory provision allowing district attorneys to commence prosecu-
tions, on the other hand, was first adopted in 1945. In that year, pros-
ecutors were given explicit statutory powers, coextensive with the pow-
ers of the courts, to issue criminal complaints. Only in 1969, with the
adoption of section 968.02(1), did the legislature give prosecutors the
primary statutory authority to issue complaints. 35 Thus, because of its
long-standing existence, the John Doe proceeding did not violate Wis-
consin separation of powers doctrine.36 Chief Justice Heffernan then
overruled Connors, concluding that the holding in Unnamed Defendant
constituted a sub silentio overruling of the constitutional infirmity of
section 968.02(3). 37
29. WIs. STAT. § 968.26 (1989-1990). See supra note 15.
30. Id.
31. Unnamed Defendant, 150 Wis. 2d at 357-58, 441 N.W.2d at 697-98.
32. Id. at 365, 441 N.W.2d at 701.
33. The court based much of its historical analysis on information provided in an
article written in response to Connors. See Becker, Judicial Scrutiny ofProsecutorial Discretion
in the Decision Not to File a Complaint, 71 MARQ. L. REv. 749 (1988).
34. Unnamed Defendant, 150 Wis. 2d at 363, 441 N.W.2d at 699-700.
35. Id. at 363, 441 N.W.2dat 700.
36. Id. at 366-67, 441 N.W.2d at 701.
37. Id. at 365, 441 N.W.2d at 701.
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III. ANALYSIS OF THE UNNAMED DEFENDANT OPINION
At its core, the Unnamed Defendant opinion is based on a very
simple premise: because the initiation of prosecutions was not the ex-
clusive domain of the executive branch when the state constitution was
adopted, separation of powers doctrine is not violated by statutes that
give judicial officers charging power. This section questions the his-
torical premises relied upon by the court in reaching its conclusion.
Subsequent sections examine and criticize the rationales used by the
Unnamed Defendant court to buttress its conclusion that Wisconsin
Statutes sections 968.02(3) and 968.26 are constitutional.
A. The Court's Misperception of the Historic Role of Wisconsin
District Attorneys
A linchpin in the rigid constitutional analysis employed in Un-
named Defendant is the court's understanding of the historical role of
the Wisconsin district attorney. Scrutiny of this history, however, re-
veals that the court understated this role. Historically, the charging
decision has not "traditionally been considered a judicial power,"3 8 as
was contended by the court. Rather, Wisconsin prosecutors historically
have played a significant role in the charging decision, and this role
has increased markedly in accord with the demands of the state's justice
system.
Consideration of the constitution and the statutes in place at the
time of Wisconsin's origin does not provide much guidance as to the
original function of the Wisconsin district attorney. The first Wisconsin
constitution, adopted in 1848, is notably silent as to the duties of the
district attorney. Only in article VI, section 4, is the position mentioned
at all and then only to establish the term of office and procedures to
fill vacancies. 39
The statutes of the era provide little additional information. Chap-
ter 10, sections 63-64 of the 1889 statutes, makes the first mention of
prosecutors' duties: district attorneys shall prosecute or defend in court
all matters in which the state has an interest and must conduct criminal
examinations at the request of magistrates. 40 Chapter 146, section 7,
provided that district attorneys have subpoena powers.4
38. Id. at 366, 441 N.W.2d at 701. Despite the fundamental importance of the
matter, the question of whether prosecution is a traditional executive function has only
recently been scrutinized. See Note, Is Prosecution a Core Executive Function? Morrison v.
Olson and the Framers' Intent, 99 YALE L.J. 1069 (1990).
39. WIS. CONST. art. VI, § 4.
40. An Act Concerning the Attorney-General and District Attorneys, Stats. of the
Territory of Wis. 94 (1839).
41. Id. at § 7.
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In contrast, the statutes of the time are relatively clear on the duties
of judges. Chapter 145, section 1, provided that judges shall issue "pro-
cess"; 42 chapter 146, section 16, provided that in the absence of prob-
able cause at a preliminary examination a magistrate may not bind
over a defendant for trial.43 Chapter 145, carried over from 1839 ter-
ritorial statutes, contained what today is known as the John Doe statute.
Originally entitled "An Act to Provide for the Arrest and Examination
of Offenders, Commitment for Trial and Taking Bail," this statute
provided:
Upon complaint made to any such magistrate that a criminal
offence has been committed, he shall examine on oath the
complainant and any witnesses produced by him, and shall
reduce the complaint to writing... and if it shall appear that
any such offence has been committed, the court or justice shall
issue a warrant reciting the substance of the accusation."
Thus, as late as 1889, as noted by Justice Steinmetz in his Connors
dissent, "[it] is not clear in these statutes whether the magistrate or the
district attorney would make the decision to issue the complaint. '45
It was not until the middle of the twentieth century that the statutes
expressly described the role of the district attorney in the charging
decision. Wisconsin Statutes section 361.02(1), promulgated in 1945,
empowered the district attorney to swear complaints and issue war-
rants.46 In 1969 the legislature enacted section 968.02, the statute con-
sidered in Connors.47
Seen in the broader context of the history of the public prosecutor,
this perceived lack of definitiveness in the role of prosecutors is perhaps
not surprising. For, as noted by Joan Jacoby, the prosecutor is a pe-
culiarly twentieth-century development. 48 Initially, the local prosecut-
42. Ch. 145 § 1.
43. Ch. 146 § 16.
44. Wis. REV. STAT., ch. 145 §§ 1-2 (1849).
45. Connors, 136 Wis. 2d 118, 168-69, 401 N.W.2d 782, 803 (Steinmetz, J., dis-
senting).
46. WIs. STAT. § 362.02(1) (1945).
47. WIS. STAT. § 968.02 (1989-1990). In 1969, contemporaneous with the enactment
of WIs. STAT. § 968.02, the legislature repealed Wis. STAT. § 955.17 (1955). This latter law
provided that if the district attorney determined that an information should not be filed,
then she had to file a statement of explanation. If the court was not satisfied with the reasons,
the court would direct the district attorney to file the information. This statute originated in
1871, at the time requirements for grand jury indictments were eliminated. See Becker, supra
note 33, at 751.
48. J. JACOBY, THE AMERICAN PROSECUTOR: A SEARCH FOR IDENTITY 31-32
(1980). The office of the public prosecutor has no clear historical antecedent. Under traditional
Anglo-American common law, prosecutions were carried out in the name of the victim by
private attorneys retained by victims or other interested parties. The emergence of the public
prosecutor in the colonial era replaced this system: prosecutions were brought by a publicly-
1990:1695 1703
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ing attorney was considered a judicial figure-"a minor figure in the
court, an adjunct to the judge. His position was primarily judicial, and
perhaps only quasi-executive. 49
Even in states where separate [constitutional] articles were
written for local and county officers, the prosecuting attorney
... was relegated to a subsection of those articles establishing
the structure and officers of the state court systems. Never
was he listed as a member of the executive branch; never was
he described as an officer of local government. He was ...
clearly a minor actor in the court's structure. 50
In state constitutions, as in Wisconsin, much greater emphasis and
deference was provided the sheriff and county coroner; their offices
were the first to gain independent status and to be locally elected.51
"As a subsidiary of the courts, [the prosecutor] was considered merely
an adjunct to the real powers of the courts, the judges."52
For decades, district attorneys performed in relative anonymity.
Not until the 1920s did the district attorney become the subject of
research attention. Early crime commissions of the era were both
shocked at and critical of the great power they discovered local pros-
ecutors possessed." 3 At the same time, however, researchers recognized
that crime rates were increasing and that independent specialists were
needed. The enormous case volumes then first burdening the justice
systems of the cities necessarily precluded the courts from adjudicating
anywhere near the entirety; some system of screening out the less worth-
while cases was needed. 54 The Wickersham Commission, writing in
1931, recognized that "[tihe sifting which must be done somewhere,
and in a proper system should be done at the outset, had to be done
by the prosecuting attorney."55 By World War II, the office of the pros-
ecutor had become central in the criminal justice system.56
Notably, this growth in power came at the expense of the other
elected, unbiased actor in the name of the state. As a result, the object of prosecutions shifted
from the vindication of private wrongs to the promotion of public interests like deterrence
and rehabilitation. Cardenas, The Crime Victim in the Prosecutorial Process, 9 HARV. J.L.
& PUB. POL'Y 357, 387-88 (1986).
49. J. JACOBY, supra note 48, at 23.
50. Id. For a discussion of the origins of public prosecutors in the federal system,
see Note, supra note 38, at 1082-88.
51. J. JACOBY, supra note 48, at 24. See also Wis. CONST. art. VII, § 4.
52. J. JACOBY, supra note 48, at 24.
53. See, e.g., MISSOURI CRIME COMMISSION (1926); CLEVELAND CRIME COMMIS-
SION (1922).
54. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON LAW OBSERVANCE AND ENFORCEMENT [WICKER-
SHAM COMMISSION], Report on Prosecution 87 (1931).
55. Id. at 20.
56. J. JACOBY, supra note 48, at 39.
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actors in the criminal justice system. 7 Of necessity, case initiation
procedures common to earlier eras were replaced by the emerging func-
tions of local prosecutors. This development has been noted by the
American Bar Association:
Whatever may have been feasible in the past, modem con-
ditions require that the authority to commence criminal pro-
ceedings be vested in a professional, trained, responsible pub-
lic official.... Historically, the power to initiate prosecutions
was not vested exclusively in public officials but was shared
with private citizens. The essential screening to determine
whether there was substance to a charge was performed by
the magistrate... or by the grand jury. The emergence of the
professional prosecutor ... fundamentally altered this situa-
tion. The advent of the office of the public prosecutor pro-
vided a new and professional medium of screening that had
not been previously available.58
The evolution of the district attorney's office was no different in
Wisconsin. From a relatively early daie, Wisconsin took steps to ensure
that its public prosecutors upheld their obligation to impartially ad-
minister the criminal laws. In 1888, the Wisconsin Supreme Court
decided Biemel v. State, holding that the use of prosecuting attorneys
compensated by private persons in criminal actions was against public
policy. 9 According to the court, "[T]he district attorney, who is the
officer provided by the laws of the state to initiate and carry on such
trials, shall be unprejudiced and unpaid except by the state, and shall
have no private interest in such prosecution. ' 60 To allow otherwise,
the court held, would run the risk of vindictive prosecutions, compro-
mising the essential unbiased nature of the state's criminal courts.61 In
57. This shift has been described by Professor McDonald as follows:
In this transformation the office of the public prosecutor has grown from virtually
a nonexistent role to the position of central actor in the system. Much of this growth
has been by displacing ... the police, the judiciary, and the defense bar from territory
that once was theirs .... The increase in the size and complexity of the criminal
justice industry brought with it the need for a centralized chief executive to bring
some efficiency and coordination to its operation. The public prosecutor was the
only component in the system able to do this.
W. McDONALD, THE PROSECUTORS 46 (1979).
58. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, Standard
3-3.4 Commentary (1980) [hereinafter ABA STANDARDS].
59. 71 Wis. 444, 37 N.W. 244 (1888). This deference to the publicly-elected and
impartial office of the district attorney was rare for its day. Indeed, in 1886 the Utah Supreme
Court approved of the assistance of the public prosecutor by private counsel retained by the
associates of the deceased, stating: "The more learning and ability brought to bear on the
case, the better." People v. Tidwell, 4 Utah 506, 513, 12 P. 61, 64 (1886).
60. Biemel, 71 Wis. at 450, 37 N.W. at 247.
61. Id. at 451, 37 N.W. at 247-48. A similar sentiment was expressed later by the
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1892, to ensure the professional quality of the office, the Wisconsin
Supreme Court in State v. Russell 62 held that prosecutors must be
attorneys and members of the state bar.6 3 Such requirements were ap-
propriate given the considerable power the supreme court perceived
the office to have. In Wight v. Rindskoph, decided in 1877, the court
stated:
A public prosecutor is a quasi judicial officer, retained by the
public for the prosecution of persons accused of crime, in the
exercise of sound discretion to distinguish between the guilty
and the innocent, between the certainly and the doubtfully
guilty; never voluntarily to acquiesce in an acquittal upon
certain presumptions of guilt, or in conviction upon doubtful
presumption of guilt.... He is trusted with broad official dis-
cretion, generally subject, however, to judicial control.64
The state's increasing reliance on district attorneys to serve faithfully
the interests of the state manifested itself again in 1870. In that year,
the state constitution was amended, resulting in the prosecutor's in-
formation eclipsing the grand jury's indictment as the state's principal
accusatory device.65
Subsequent years witnessed an unrelenting growth in the powers
of the office. The state's growing justice system, like that of the nation
as a whole, required the services of a centralized executive officer to
handle increasing case loads. In 1927, Wisconsin Supreme Court Justice
Crownhart spoke to this need in an address to the state district attor-
neys' convention:
It is frequently said by certain altruistic persons that the law
should be strictly enforced and for any infraction thereof pun-
ishment must be swift and sure. However, men of practical
experience in life recognize that no such ideal, if it be an ideal,
is possible. The public officials having to deal with crime must
winnow and sift from the offenders those who are the most
guilty ... for vigorous prosecution. 66
This necessary discretionary authority among district attorneys was
court in State v. Peterson, 195 Wis. 351, 218 N.W. 367 (1928). There the court stated that
in Wisconsin "we have private prosecution for private wrongs and public prosecution for
public wrongs. Our scheme contemplates that an impartial man selected by the electors of
the county shall prosecute all criminal actions in the county unbiased by desires of com-
plaining witnesses or that of the defendant." Id. at 356. 218 N.W. at 369.
62. 83 Wis. 330, 53 N.W. 441 (1892) 218 N.W. at 369.
63. Id. at 332-33, 53 N.W. at 442. This professional evolution continues even to
this day. See Wis. STAT. § 978.13 (1989-1990) (promulgated in 1989, making district attorneys
state employees).
64. 43 Wis. 344, 354 (1877).
65. See State v. Leicham, 41 Wis. 565, 572-73 (1877) (describing the procedural
evolution).
66. Address of Justice Charles H. Crownhart, delivered at District Attorneys' Con-
vention in May 1927, 16 Op. Att'y. Gen. xlix (1927).
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evident in supreme court opinions of the era as well. In 1923, in Ap-
plication of Bertine,67 the Wisconsin Supreme Court observed that the
district attorney was not merely an "administrative officer," 68 but a
key actor looked to by citizens to exercise "sound discretion." 69 Ac-
cording to the court:
The office of the district attorney is a constitutional office. It
is held as a public trust, and the incumbent is charged with
grave responsibilities calling for the exercise of learning in the
law and sound judgment. The duties of the office should be
discharged vigorously and without fear or favor.7 °
By 1968, the centrality of district attorneys in the charging decision
was beyond doubt. In State ex rel. Kurkierewicz v. Cannon,7' the Wis-
consin Supreme Court held that the discretion of district attorneys to
initiate coroner's inquests, a duty ceded to them by the legislature in
1905, was not compellable in mandamus. 72 Speaking of the district
attorney's powers, the court noted:
It is clear that in his functions as a prosecutor he has great
discretion in determining whether or not to prosecute. There
is no obligation or duty upon a district attorney to prosecute
all complaints that may be filed with him. While it is his duty
to prosecute criminals, it is obvious that a great portion of
the power of the state has been placed in his hands for him
to use in furtherance of justice, and this does not require per
se prosecution in all cases where there appears to be a vio-
lation of the law no matter how trivial. In general, the district
attorney is not answerable to any other officer of the state in
respect to the manner in which he exercises those powers.
73
While it is clear that the powers of district attorneys have grown
significantly over the years, it also clear that statutory law has not always
kept pace with this de facto growth. The Opinions of the Wisconsin
Attorney General from the early 1900s to the present evidence the
67. 181 Wis. 579, 196 N.W. 213 (1923).
68. Id. at 587, 196 N.W. at 216.
69. Id. at 588, 196 N.W. at 216.
70. Id. at 587, 196 N.W. at 216-17.
71. 42 Wis. 2d 368, 166 N.W.2d 255 (1968).
72. Id. at 383, 166 N.W.2d at 262-63.
73. Id. at 378, 166 N.W.2d at 260. See also State ex rel. White v. Simpson, 28 Wis.
2d 590, 598, 137 N.W.2d 391, 394 (1965) ("We recognize that the district attorney holds an
office of great dignity and that in some respects he has quasi-judicial responsibilities. His
decision to initiate prosecution or refuse to do so is, in a sense, a judicial determination");
Thompson v. State, 61 Wis. 2d 325, 332, 212 N.W.2d 109, 112 (1973) ("For a limited time
[the district attorney] is the trustee of the public's law enforcement conscience .... In the
exercise of that public conscience he is neither the puppet of the law enforcement authorities
nor of the courts").
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emerging role of prosecutors in the charging decision and illustrate the
significant actual role of district attorneys, in marked contrast to their
modest role prescribed in the constitution and early statutes.
In an opinion dated March 20, 1918, the state attorney general
responded to a district attorney's inquiry regarding whether to prose-
cute, at the mayor's urging, a rarely used "blue law" that would result
in the closing of a saloon. The district attorney believed that it was his
duty to prosecute only after a criminal complaint, made in good faith,
was obtained by a citizen. In this instance he believed that the mayor
may have had an improper, underlying political motive. The attorney
general declined to adopt so modest a view of the district attorney's
discretion:
It is true that there is not in our statutes an expressed pro-
vision making it the duty of the district attorney to make a
complaint when a criminal law has been violated.... The
office of the district attorney is a constitutional office (art. VI,
§ 4), and the prosecuting officer elected by the people in each
county in the state.... It has been the practice in this state
for district attorneys to make the complaint in a great many
of the prosecutions, and the district attorneys are generally
looked to by the people to bring the prosecutions where the
criminal law has been clearly violated.14
Similarly, in 1936, at the conclusion of a review of the statutory duties
of district attorneys, the attorney general observed:
From the statutes above it might seem that the district at-
torney's duties in prosecution begin after a complaint has been
filed or other preliminary steps taken ... but both public opin-
ion and the courts have made it clear that it is the duty of
the district attorney to instigate action upon his own knowl-
edge as well as to prosecute after the indictment or complaint
is filed.... Thus it is the duty of the district attorney to in-
stitute criminal proceedings whenever a criminal statute is
74. 7 Op. Att'y Gen. 176, 177-78 (1918). See also 18 Op. Att'y Gen. 317, 319 (1925),
in which a prosecutor informed the grandfather of a child killed in an auto accident that he
would institute criminal proceedings if the grandfather wished. The prosecutor, however, was
worried that the grandfather might have had a vengeful motive because he lost a civil wrongful
death action on the matter. Moreover, it did not appear that the motorist's actions merited
a conviction. The prosecutor consulted the attorney general regarding which course to pursue.
The latter responded that the outcome of the civil action did not preclude a criminal pros-
ecution. Nor did it matter that the complainant might have a spiteful motive when the facts
showed a legal violation and that a conviction might have been obtained: "If, from all the
facts and circumstances in the above case, you are of the opinion that it is useless ... to
start a prosecution as no conviction can be secured in your county, then you are certainly
justified in not bringing the prosecution."
1708
1990:1695
violated, even though no complaint or information has been
filed.75
This disjunction between law and actual practice also was evident
to Frank Miller in his landmark American Bar Foundation study of
Wisconsin prosecutors. In Prosecution: The Decision to Charge a Sus-
pect with a Crime, Miller discussed the preeminent role Wisconsin
district attorneys came to assume in the issuance of arrest warrants by
the 1950S.76 By virtue of the legislature's enactment of Wisconsin stat-
utes section 361.02(1),77 both magistrates and district attorneys could
issue complaints without the concurrence of the other. In practice,
however, district attorneys exercised virtually complete control over
the determination of probable cause and the issuance of warrants. 78
To Miller, this control was not surprising, given that most arrests by
police were conducted without warrants and charging decisions by pros-
ecutors, therefore, occurred after arrest. 79
When the prosecutor's de facto control over prosecutions gen-
erally is combined with the observed practice of using the
arrest warrant primarily as a charging document rather than
to perform its historical arrest-authorizing function, it is in-
evitable that the prosecutor should assume control over its
issuance. 80
The warrant decision, Miller observed, thus became a "kaleidoscope
for the pragmatic considerations insofar as it relates to charging"; the
issuance of a warrant, without the support of the prosecutor, would be
futile in the face of the prosecutor's power to subsequently screen the
accused from the system. 81 "The refusal to issue a warrant without
prior prosecutorial approval, then, is not mysterious. '8 2
Thus, it is clear that the actual role of the prosecutor in initiating
prosecutions has been understated in the state's law books. Interest-
ingly, an identical difference between law and practice was observed
in 1934 by professors Newman Baker and Earl De Long, in what today
is still perhaps the classic work on American prosecutors:
The constitutional provisions and statutes which define the
75. 25 Op. Att'y Gen. 549, 557 (1936). But see 14 Op. Att'y Gen. 15 (1930) (strict
statutory construction of district attorney's duties).
76. F. MILLER, PROSECUTION: THE DECISION TO CHARGE A SUSPECT WITH A CRIME
(1970).
77. WIS. STAT. § 361.02(1) (1945).
78. See F. MILLER, supra note 76, at 55.
79. Id. at ll.
80. Id. at 55. For further discussion of the confusion surrounding the functions of
post-arrest warrants and complaints, see Remington & Logan, Frank Miller and the Decision
to Prosecute, 69 WASH. U.L.Q. 159 (1991).
81. Id. at 56 n.29.
82. Id. at 56.
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powers and duties of the prosecuting attorneys of the various
states certainly do not depict this office as it actually functions,
for the habits and routine of administration often-perhaps
usually-make the practical picture far different from the legal
outline upon which it is built.83
The reason for this disparity is unclear. One possible explanation
may be found in the observation of Judge Thurman Arnold over fifty
years ago: "[t]he idea that a prosecuting attorney should be permitted
to use his discretion concerning the laws which he will enforce and
those which he will disregard appears to the ordinary citizen to border
on anarchy."84 Such circumstances would constitute a strong disincen-
tive for de jure recognition of prosecutors' discretionary power to in-
itiate prosecutions.
Whatever the reason, the image presented of the charging decision
by the Unnamed Defendant court differs from reality. Doubtless, at the
time of the state's origin (as elsewhere in the United States) magistrates
played a central role in initiating prosecutions, in contrast to the am-
biguous role of district attorneys. However, as the state and its criminal
justice needs evolved, so did the office of the public prosecutor, and
the state's law has not always recognized this de facto power. Seen in
these terms, the Unnamed Defendant court's view of the "traditional"
role of Wisconsin prosecutors is understated. While it is true that the
decision to charge has not always exclusively resided in the executive
branch, it is also true that it has not resided exclusively in the domain
of the judiciary. Rather, prosecutors have come to wield significant
charging powers, accounting for a charging system wherein the exec-
utive, over time and to varying degrees, has at a minimum shared the
charging role with the judiciary.
B. The Court's Originalism
Even if one were to grant that the court was correct in its assertion
that charging "traditionally" has been the "exclusive domain" of the
court, and not a power significantly shared with Wisconsin prosecutors,
the Unnamed Defendant decision may be criticized on another, more
compelling basis. This basis derives from the court's constitutional
rationale: because the power to initiate criminal prosecutions was not
the "exclusive" power of prosecutors when the Wisconsin constitution
was adopted, the separation of powers doctrine is not violated by pro-
83. Baker & De Long, The Prosecuting Attorney: Powers and Duties in Criminal
Prosecution, 24 J. AM. INST. CRIM. LAW & CRIMINOLOGY 1025, 1025 (1934).
84. Arnold, Law Enforcement-An Attempt at Social Dissection, 42 YALE L.J. 1, 7
(1932).
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cedures that potentially eviscerate the executive's role in the charging
decision.
Such a wooden, "originalist"85 approach is both unrealistic and at
odds with accepted modes of Wisconsin constitutional interpretation.
Historically, the Wisconsin Supreme Court has conceived of the state
constitution as "a set of principles, not rules" that must be construed
in light of the realities and demands of the changing state.8 6 Inevitably,
this dynamic view of constitutional interpretation is at odds with the
written nature of the constitution. Almost eighty years ago, in Borgnis
v. Falk Co.,87 the Wisconsin Supreme Court recognized this tension:
That governments founded on written constitutions ... lose
much in flexibility and adaptability to changed conditions
there can be no doubt. A constitution is a very human doc-
ument, and must embody with greater or less fidelity the spirit
of the time of its adoption. It will be framed to meet the
problems and difficulties which face the men who make it,
and will generally crystallize... the political, social, and eco-
nomic propositions which are considered irrefutable.... But
the difficulty is that, while the constitution is fixed or very
hard to change, the conditions and problems surrounding the
people, as well as their ideals, are constantly changing.88
To expect that any written declaration could effectively anticipate
the unforeseen developments wrought by social and economic change
"would be tantamount to an egotistical declaration that when the con-
stitution was framed the millennium had arrived and progress had
reached its ultimate goal."8 9 Necessarily, then, for the constitution to
have prescriptive and continuing utility it must be construed in light
of the changes occurring since its adoption. According to the Borgnis
court:
[W]here there is no express command or prohibition, but only
general language or policy to be considered, the conditions
prevailing at the time of [the constitution's] adoption must
have their due weight; but the changed social, economic, and
governmental conditions and ideals of the time, as well as the
problems which the changes have produced, must also logi-
85. "Originalism" has been defined by one commentator as a mode of constitutional
interpretation that "accords binding authority to the text of the Constitution or the intentions
of its adopters." Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U.L.
REv. 204, 204 (1980).
86. See, e.g., Integration of Bar Case, 244 Wis. 8, 11 N.W.2d 604 (1943).
87. 147 Wis. 327, 133 N.W. 209 (1911).
88. Id. at 348-49, 133 N.W. at 215.
89. State ex rel. Van Alstine v. Frear, 142 Wis. 320, 339, 125 N.W. 961, 968 (1910).
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cally enter into the consideration, and become influential fac-
tors in the settlement of problems of construction and inter-
pretation. 90
Unnamed Defendant, however, manifests a marked refusal to heed
this interpretive tenet. While recognizing that "not every constitutional
controversy can be resolved by simple reference to the intent of the
framers," 91 the Unnamed Defendant court nonetheless shows total de-
ference to the framers of 140 years ago. According to the court, this
was because "the framer's intent ... has special significance when we
are dealing with a matter which was demonstrably contemplated by
the framers. We may confidently presume that the framers were familiar
with, and earnestly concerned about, the question we address in this
case: the proper procedure for the initiation of criminal actions. 92
The enormous changes occurring in the last 140 years cast signif-
icant doubt on whether the complexities of the modern justice system
were "demonstrably contemplated" by the framers. The growth of the
state and the concomitant burgeoning of its criminal justice system
created the need for a centralized, popularly elected official to serve as
the discretionary "gatekeeper" for the justice system. 93 Today this need
is filled by the state's prosecutors. This is not to say that change is the
end-all of constitutional inquiry. Rather, as Dean Sandalow observed,
"[t]he relevant past for purposes of constitutional law... is to be found
not only in the intentions of those who drafted and ratified the doc-
ument but in the entirety of our history." 94 This same sentiment was
echoed by Justice Holmes in Missouri v. Holland: "The case before us
90. Borgnis, 147 Wis. at 349-50, 133 N.W. at 216. See also B.F. Sturtavant Co. v.
Industrial Commission: "The language of a constitution is not to be limited to the precise
things considered therein, but it embraces other things as they come into being .. " 186
Wis. 10, 19, 202 N.W. 324, 327 (1925); In re Village of Chenequa: "The Constitution, while
remaining the same, is sufficiently elastic to be applied to the changing conditions of the life
and growth of the state." 197 Wis. 163, 171, 221 N.W. 856, 859 (1928) (citation omitted). A
similar sentiment was expressed by Justice Holmes in Missouri v. Holland:
[W]hen we are dealing with words that are also a constituent act, like the Constitution
of the United States, we must realize that they have called into life a being the
development of which could not have been foreseen completely by the most gifted
of its begetters. It was enough for them to realize or to hope that they had created
an organism; it has taken a century and cost their successors much sweat and blood
to prove that they created a nation. The case before us must be considered in light
of our whole experience and not merely in that of what was said a hundred years
ago.
252 U.S. 416, 433-34 (1920). See also McCulloch v. Maryland, where Chief Justice Marshall
stated that the United States Constitution is "intended to endure for all ages to come, and,
consequently, to be adapted to the various crises of human affairs." 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316,
415 (1819).
91. Unnamed Defendant, 150 Wis. 2d at 361, 441 N.W.2d at 669.
92. Id. at 362, 441 N.W.2d at 669.
93. See supra notes 59-75 and accompanying text.
94. Sandalow, Constitutional Interpretation, 79 MIcH. L. REv. 1033, 1071 (1981).
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must be considered in light of our whole experience and not merely in
that of what was said a hundred years ago." 95 In this sense, the incre-
mental modifications occurring in our system of government, especially
in the administration of justice, themselves deserve consideration.
The shortcoming of the Unnamed Defendant court's rationale is
evident by taking the analysis to its natural conclusion. In ultimate
terms, such a view would require the freezing of the duties of consti-
tutional officers to those they possessed at the origin of the state. Under
such circumstances, private prosecutions by crime victims and fee col-
lections for services by prosecutors, practices long since abandoned in
the state, would be condoned. 96
C. Separation of Powers Analysis
A byproduct of the court's originalist constitutional analysis is its
strained separation of powers argument. As with the federal constitu-
tion, the doctrine of separation of powers in Wisconsin is not expressly
provided for in the state constitution.97 Rather, the concept is "em-
95. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433-34 (1920). Dean Sandalow phrases this
same notion in a more contemporary context:
The point is not that we should expect the historical meaning of a constitutional
provision to be immediately ignored if an army of social scientists were suddenly
to demonstrate that the well-being of the nation would be served thereby. Changes
in law do not come about that way.... Changes in constitutional law, and the altered
circumstances, knowledge, and valuations that underlie them, occur incrementally.
The original meaning of the document is not abandoned at a single moment, but
gradually.
Sandalow, supra note 94, at 1063.
96. During the nineteenth century, fee collection was commonplace. See Baker, The
ProsecutingAttorney: LegalAspects of the Office, 26 J. AM. INST. CRIM. LAW & CRIMINOLOGY
647, 652 (1935). In 1888, the Wisconsin Supreme Court discontinued the practice of private
prosecution in the state. See supra note 59 and accompanying text. Previous decisions by
the court evinced no qualms about the practice. See Rounds v. State, 57 Wis. 45, 14 N.W.
865 (1883); Lawrence v. State, 50 Wis. 507, 7 N.W. 343 (1883).
The questionable nature of the court's originalist view is underscored by federal case
law as well. Chief Justice Warren, cognizant of the necessity of construing the United States
Constitution in terms of modern realities, noted in Brown v. Board of Education that "in
approaching this problem, we cannot turn the clock back to 1868 when the Amendment was
adopted, or even to 1896 when Plessy v. Ferguson was written.... We must consider public
education in the light of its full development and its present place in American life throughout
the Nation." 347 U.S. 483, 492-93 (1953). Indeed, as noted by Professor Tushnet, the ultimate
(and most believe proper) outcome of Brown would be very much in doubt had the Court
embraced an originalist view. M. TUSHNET, RED, WHITE AND BLUE 41 (1988). Tushnet offers
an "exemplary" (and infamous) instance of the Court's use of originalist analysis in Dred
Scott v. Sandford, where Chief Justice Taney surveyed colonial American attitudes toward
African-Americans and on this basis concluded that slavery was constitutional. Id. at 44-45.
Additional evidence of the Court's less than wholehearted embrace of originalism is
found in its increasingly accommodating views toward the contracts clause, once believed
inviolate. See e.g., Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 442 (1934).
97. Unnamed Defendant, 150 Wis. 2d at 360, 441 N.W.2d at 699.
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bodied in the clauses of the Wisconsin Constitution providing that the
legislative power shall be vested in a senate and assembly (article IV,
section 1), the executive power in a governor and lieutenant governor
(article V, section 1) and the judicial power in the courts (article VII,
section 2).-98
Separation of powers doctrine is premised on the belief that the
dispersal of powers among the three branches of government--execu-
tive, legislative and judicial-operates as a "bulwark against tyranny." 99
Under such a system the naturally and mutually self-seeking branches
exist in counterpoise. As noted by the Wisconsin Supreme Court: "The
doctrine of separation of powers should be viewed as a general principle
to be applied to maintain the balance between the three branches of
government, preserve their respective independence and integrity, and
prevent concentration of unchecked power in the hands of any one
branch.'1°° In addition to these institutional benefits, the "checks and
balances" of the separation of powers doctrine provide citizens with
other, more practical protections from tyranny. According to Justice
Abrahamson, "[c]oncurrent powers afford the people greater protection:
when the people perceive a need to which one branch has not been
responsive, they can turn to the other branch for assistance."' 10 1
The court has held repeatedly, however, that the doctrine does not
compel the complete disassociation of the branches. 0 2 Rather, to better
serve the needs of the state, the branches on occasion share powers.
There are 'great borderlands of power' ... in which it is dif-
ficult to determine where the functions of one branch end and
those of another begin. The doctrine of separation of powers
does not demand a strict, complete, absolute, scientific di-
vision of functions between the three branches of government.
The separation of powers doctrine states the principle of
shared, rather than completely separated powers. The doctrine
envisions a government of separated branches sharing certain
powers. '03
98. State v. Washington, 83 Wis. 2d 808, 816, 266 N.W.2d 597, 601 (1978).
99. United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 443 (1965).
100. Layton School of Art & Design, 82 Wis. 2d 324, 348, 262 N.W.2d 218, 229
(1977).
101. In Matter of Complaint Against Grady, 118 Wis. 2d 762, 790, 348 N.W.2d 559,
573 (1984) (Abrahamson, J., concurring).
102. See, e.g., Rules of Court Case, 204 Wis. 501, 504, 236 N.W. 717, 718 (1931):
It is not only a matter of some difficulty to set precisely the border lines of legislative,
executive, and judicial powers, but it also seems quite clear that either by custom
or constitutional mandate, or the inherent necessities of the situation, the three
branches of government have heretofore exercised other powers than those which,
under the doctrine of separation of powers, belong peculiarly and exclusively to
them.
103. State v. Holmes, 106 Wis. 2d 31, 43, 315 N.W.2d 703, 709 (1981). See also
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In these areas of "shared powers," one branch is entitled to "exercise
power conferred on another only to an extent that does not unduly
burden or substantially interfere with the other branch's exercise of its
power.''" With respect to legislative-judicial relations, the supreme
court has remarked that when "the exercise of administrative and leg-
islative power [has] so far invaded the judicial field as to embarrass
the court and impair its proper functioning [the court will be] compelled
to maintain its integrity as a constitutional institution." 10 5 This said,
the Unnamed Defendant opinion exhibits two essential flaws in its
separation of powers analysis.
The first flaw stems from the opinion's notable disavowal of Wis-
consin case law regarding excessive intrusions by one branch on func-
tions "shared" with another. On the basis of the previously recounted
history concerning the initiation of prosecutions, 10 6 it would appear
that at a minimum the executive has historically shared the charging
function with the state's judiciary. 107 However, it is clear that over the
greater part of the twentieth century the prosecutor has become the
linchpin of the criminal justice system, assuming great discretionary
powers in the charging decision.108 Frank Miller concluded that this
ascendance derived from practical reasons stemming from need and
the particular nature of the office itself:
[I]n performing his screening functions-both in evidence suf-
ficiency and discretionary aspects-the prosecutor is more
aware of the unique facts that characterize particular cases,
and this general knowledge, coupled with his direct respon-
siveness to community attitudes better qualifies him to assess
both whether the suspect is probably guilty and convictable
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring)
("While the Constitution diffuses power the better to secure liberty, it also contemplates that
practice will integrate the dispersed powers into a workable government. It enjoins upon its
branches separateness but interdependence, autonomy but reciprocity").
104. Grady, 118 Wis. 2d at 775, 348 N.W.2d at 566 (Abrahamson, J., concurring).
105. Integration of Bar Case, 244 Wis. 8, 49, 11 N.W.2d 604, 623 (1943).
106. See supra notes 38-84 and accompanying text.
107. Further evidence of this sharing relationship between prosecutors and the ju-
diciary is evident in the history of the John Doe statute itself, Wis. STAT. § 968.26 (1989-
1990). Noting the invaluable symbiotic relation between the executive and judiciary, the
court in Kurkierewicz v. Canon related that the "John Doe is a feeble investigative device
indeed, unless both the district attorney and the magistrate are amenable to using their offices
in furtherance of the investigation." 42 Wis. 2d 368, 377, 166 N.W.2d 255, 259 (1968).
108. See ABA STANDARDS, supra note 58, Standard 3-1.1 Commentary: "Since the
prosecutor bears a large share of the responsibility for determining which cases are taken into
the courts, the character, quality, and efficiency of the whole system is shaped in great measure
by the manner in which the prosecutor exercises his or her broad discretionary powers." See
also Thomas & Fitch, Prosecutorial Decision Making, 13 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 507, 509 (1976):
"[T]he prosecutor plays a dual role. He is a decision maker in the individual case and the
administrator of an integral part of the criminal justice system."
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and in what manner it is in the public interest to proceed
against him if he is. 10 9
Given this historical context, the court's approval of Wisconsin
Statutes sections 968.26 and 968.02(3) rests on shaky constitutional
ground. Professor (later Justice) Frankfurter, in his analysis of "shared
power" cases decided by the United States Supreme Court, observed
that "[tihe dominant note is respect for the action of that branch of
the government upon which is cast the primary responsibility for ad-
justing public affairs." ' 10 In Unnamed Defendant, the Wisconsin Su-
preme Court showed scant "respect" for the executive, the branch
which has assumed "primary responsibility" for charging. As will be
discussed in greater detail later,"' the court's approval of sections
968.02(3) and 968.26 has the practical effect of potentially obviating
the executive office of the prosecutor in the charging decision: com-
plainants may circumvent local district attorneys by first approaching
the courts for the issuance of criminal complaints.
It strains credulity to say that such procedures do not "substan-
tially interfere" with or "embarrass" district attorneys in their accu-
satory role in the criminal justice process. In the Rules of Court Case,
perhaps the Wisconsin Supreme Court's foremost opinion on separa-
tion of powers, the court acknowledged:
The coordinate branches of government ... should not ab-
dicate or permit others to infringe upon such powers as are
exclusively committed to their power by the constitution. As
to the exercise of those powers, however, which are not ex-
clusively committed to them, there should be such generous
cooperation as will tend to keep the law responsive to the
needs of society. This cooperation is peculiarly necessary to-
day.... 112
The Unnamed Defendant court did not heed the mandate of its prede-
cessor courts. By fixating, erroneously, on where the "exclusive" powers
might have lain for charging, rather than on the reality of the contem-
porary justice system, the court exhibited little of the "generous co-
operation as will tend to keep the law responsive to the needs of so-
ciety."" 13 In so doing, the court violated the delicate and subtle checks
and balances intrinsic to Wisconsin constitutional law. 1 4
109. See F. MILLER, supra note 76, at 296.
110. Frankfurter & Landis, Power of Congress Over Procedure in Criminal Contempts
in "Inferior" Federal Courts-A Study in Separation of Powers, 37 HARv. L. REV. 1010, 1016
(1923).
111. See infra notes 180-96 and accompanying text.
112. 204 Wis. 501, 514, 236 N.W. 717, 722 (1931).
113. Id.
114. Little Wisconsin case law exists relating to judicial intrusions on the executive
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A second troubling aspect of the Unnamed Defendant opinion is
its disregard for the central premise of separation of powers analysis:
the doctrine should be viewed as a "set of principles and not of rules""II
to "prevent concentration of unchecked power in the hands of any one
branch."1 16 Ultimately, the court's narrow consideration of where the
power to charge might have resided in Wisconsin's distant past does
violence to the larger goals historically served by separation of powers
doctrine.
A central idea in the genesis of the separation of powers doctrine,
borrowed by Wisconsin from the federal government, is that allowing
one branch to wield both accusatory and judicial powers would threaten
the impartial administration of justice. 117 The framers of the federal
constitution recognized this threat to exist both when the executive
exercises undue influence over the judiciary and when the judiciary
controls the executive. James Madison, in the Federalist Papers, ex-
pressed the fear that if the courts held "the executive power, the judge
might behave with all the violence of an oppressor."' 18 This fear has
since manifested itself repeatedly through the years in decisions man-
dating a "neutrality requirement"1 19 so strict that even the appearance
of judicial bias has been staunchly guarded against. 12 0
In the context of the criminal justice process, neutrality is of par-
ticular importance. A defendant's right to a fair trial is compromised
by even the appearance of the court assuming the mantle of prosecu-
torial advocacy. 121 For this reason, courts have consistently refused to
114. Little Wisconsin case law exists relating to judicial intrusions on the executive
in shared power contexts. But see In Interest of J.A., 138 Wis. 2d 483, 406 N.W.2d 272 (1987)
(statute allowing court to order that information be provided regarding children receiving
child welfare services does not unduly interfere because the executive agency is already
required to maintain such information).
115. Integration of Bar Case, 244 Wis. 8, 46, 11 N.W.2d 604, 621 (1943).
116. Layton School of Art & Design, 82 Wis. 2d 324, 348, 262 N.W.2d 218, 229. A
similar concern animates federal constitutional law. See, e.g., McCulloch v. Maryland, 17
U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819) (construction of U.S. Constitution must have regard for the
document's "great outlines" and "important objects").
117. See W. GwYN, THE MEANING OF THE SEPARATION OF POWERS 127 (1965) (one
of the major reasons for separation of powers is to "assure that the laws are impartially
administered"); M. RICHTER, THE POLITICAL THEORY OF MONTESQUIEU 84-92 (1977) (the
guarantee of an impartial judiciary is a principal justification for separation of powers).
118. THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 338 (J. Madison) (B. Wright ed. 1966) (quoting
Montesquieu) (emphasis omitted).
119. Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc. 446 U.S. 238, 242 (1980). See also Chapman v. Cali-
fornia, 386 U.S. 18, 23 (1967) (right to impartial judge is so basic to due process that courts
can never treat its infraction as harmless error); Nader v. Bork, 366 F. Supp. 104, 109 (D.D.C.
1973) ("The courts must remain neutral. Their duties are not prosecutorial").
120. See, e.g., Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U.S. 488, 501 (1973) (need for appearance of
impartiality prohibits the involvement of trial judge who previously held defendant in con-
tempt); In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955) (justice must satisfy the appearance of
justice).
121. See Note, Private Prosecutors in Criminal Contempt Actions Under Rule 42(b)
of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 54 FORDHAM L. REV. 1141, 1162-64 (1986).
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condone the active participation of the judiciary in the screening aspect
of the charging decision. 122
Unnamed Defendant, however, ignored this concern. As a result
of the decision, the judiciary can both accuse and try individuals in
Wisconsin, depriving the judiciary of its neutrality and the executive
of its independence. Such a consolidation is unseemly to modern no-
tions of procedural justice and constitutes an inherent threat to sepa-
ration of powers. As noted by Justice Abrahamson: "An expansive
concept of exclusive judicial authority ... creates the danger of un-
checked power in the judiciary."' 123
In the final analysis, one must question why the court failed in
Unnamed Defendant to apply traditional separation of powers princi-
ples. A likely answer lies in the court's fixation on correcting what it
perceived as the mistaken "premise" of Connors: "that initiation of
criminal prosecution is an exclusively executive power in Wiscon-
sin." 124 This the court achieved; as noted, the charging function has
not been the exclusive job of the executive. 125 However, in an effort to
correct the Connors court's misreading of the historical record, the
Unnamed Defendant court overvalued the inference that the corrected
record justifiably raised. That is, some sharing of the charging power
is constitutionally permissible, but the potential total removal of charg-
ing power from the executive in any given charging decision is contrary
to Wisconsin separation of powers principles as they have evolved
between the judiciary and executive over the past 140 years.
Ironically, appropriate use of separation of powers doctrine would
have led the court to a similar, but better reasoned conclusion. The
judiciary has played, and should continue to play, a role in Wisconsin
charging decisions. In the contemporary criminal justice context, the
courts can play an indispensable role in checking and conditioning the
primary power of the executive in the charging decision. 2 6 The chal-
lenge lies in integrating the historic role of the courts into a charging
122. See, e.g., Smith v. Gallagher, 408 Pa. 551, 578, 185 A.2d 135, 152 (1962). See
also Comment, Circumventing the Corrupt Prosecutor, supra note 9, at 540.
123. In Matter of Complaint Against Grady, 118 Wis. 2d 762, 790, 348 N.W.2d 559,
593 (1984) (Abrahamson, J., concurring).
124. Unnamed Defendant, 150 Wis. 2d at 358, 441 N.W.2d at 698 (emphasis added).
125. Moreover, in effect, the court corrected the mistaken view voiced in Connors
that prosecutors are not subordinate to the legislature in regard to the exercise of their powers;
they undeniably are subject to the will of the legislature. This error was recognized by Justice
Abrahamson in Connors. There, speaking of the powers of the district attorney, she noted
that" 'there is no basis for holding that his duties in representing the state are not subordinate
to legislative direction as to the cases in which he shall proceed.'" Connors, 136 Wis. 2d at
149, 401 N.W.2d at 795 (quoting State v. Coubal, 248 Wis. 247, 257, 21 N.W.2d 381, 385
(1946)).
126. See infra notes 217-29 and accompanying text.
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system consonant with the framers' desire to adapt separation of powers
"principles to the practical affairs of government in order to make the
government workable."1 27 The remainder of this Comment addresses
this challenge.
IV. CURRENT CONTROLS ON THE PROSECUTION DECISION
Unnamed Defendant presents the state with a prime opportunity
to reassess its means of controlling prosecutorial decision making. It
is clear that both the legislature 128 and a majority of the Wisconsin
Supreme Court believe that a check upon the district attorney's power
to refuse prosecutions is desirable. 129 Such a view is also widely em-
braced by the various advisory panels and commentators that have
considered the matter. The National Advisory Commission on Crim-
inal Justice Standards and Goals (NACCJSG), for one, recommends
that "[i]f the prosecutor screens a defendant, the police or the private
complainant should have recourse to the Court.', 1 3 0
A. Reasons for a Check
There are numerous reasons for some form of control over the
discretion of prosecutors to refuse prosecution. A principal reason, in-
creasingly voiced from many quarters of society and from the Connors
and Unnamed Defendant opinions themselves, stems from a concern
for the victims of crime.' 31 According to victims' advocates, a citizen
harmed by a criminal act should not be victimized yet again by a justice
system, theoretically acting in the victim's interests, that improperly
127. Integration of Bar Case, 244 Wis. 8, 46, 11 N.W.2d 604, 621 (1943).
128. The Commentary to Wis. Stat. 968.02(3) provides: "Sub. (3) provides a check
upon the district attorney who fails to authorize the issuance of a complaint, when one should
have been issued, by providing for a judge to authorize its issuance." 1969 Wis. Laws 602,
621.
129. See Unnamed Defendant, 150 Wis. 2d at 365, 441 N.W.2d at 701.
130. NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND
GOALS, THE COURTS 24 (1973) [hereinafter NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION]. While the
ABA discourages private prosecution it acknowledges that victims have a right to be heard.
The ABA states that its encouragement of public prosecution was "not intended to discourage
the adoption of a system under which a complainant may move for prosecution before a
magistrate when a prosecutor has declined to proceed ... " See ABA STANDARDS, supra note
58, at Standard 3-2.1 Commentary.
131. Unnamed Defendant, 150 Wis. 2d at 368, 441 N.W.2d at 702 (Heffernan, C.J.,
concurring); id. at 370-71, 441 N.W.2d at 703 (Day, J., concurring); Connors, 136 Wis. 2d
at 153, 401 N.W.2d at 797 (Steinmetz, J., dissenting); id. at 149, 401 N.W.2d at 795 (Abra-
hamson, J., concurring).
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refuses to prosecute. 132 Commentators expressing this view have drawn
support from myriad sources, perhaps most notably Lockean social
contract theory. According to this view, because citizens have surren-
dered to the state their natural right to protect themselves, the govern-
ment must fulfill its obligation to protect its citizens.1 33 The typical
alternate civil avenues of redress provided victims in times of prose-
cutorial inaction-civil damages and injunctions under threat of con-
tempt-are insufficient.1 34 In sum, the tenuous quid pro quo between
citizen and government is strained when the government improperly
refuses to prosecute, causing alienation and frustration, and perhaps
even the potential for vigilantism.' 35
Other commentators have identified other, non-victim-oriented
reasons to be wary of unfettered prosecutorial discretion. Roger Joseph,
for example, expresses concern over the functional problems with un-
fettered discretion. To him, such a situation involves a "qualification
of powers" normally the prerogatives of the legislative and judicial
branches:
Refusal to prosecute... may minimize the effect of or negate
altogether duly enacted statutes and regulations, thus infring-
ing upon or qualifying the lawmaking power of legislatures.
Similarly, in deciding when to prosecute ... [prosecutors]
often determine the meaning and intent of statutes and their
132. The perceived shabby treatment of victims has led one commentator to conclude
that "[t]he victims of crime are truly the forgotten people in the American criminal justice
system." Gittler, Expanding the Role of the Victim in a Criminal Action: An Overview of
Issues and Problems, 11 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 117, 117 (1984).
133. See Hudson, The Crime Victim and the Criminal Justice System: Time for a
Change, 11 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 23, 31 (1984). But cf Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 847
(1985) (Marshall, J., concurring) ("Criminal prosecutorial decisions vindicate only intangible
interests, common to society as a whole, in the enforcement of the criminal law. The conduct
at issue has already occurred; all that remains is society's general interest in assuring that
the guilty are punished").
134. See Comment, The Outmoded Concept of Private Prosecution, 25 AM. U.L. REV.
754, 789 n.182 (1976) (noting that criminal defendants are usually judgment-proof); Com-
ment, Judicially Initiated Prosecution: A Means of Preventing Continuing Victimization in
the Event of Prosecutorial Inaction, 76 CALIF. L. REV. 727, 736-40 (1988) (noting that in-
junctions are ineffective as they help only after the injury and otherwise provide little in the
way of deterrence).
135. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 308 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring)
("When people begin to believe that organized society is unwilling or unable to impose upon
criminal offenders the punishment they 'deserve,' then there are sown the seeds of anarchy-
of self-help, vigilante justice, and lynch law"). This frustration can have other negative effects
as well. Professor Welling notes that "[i]f victims feel irrelevant and alienated, they may not
cooperate in reporting and prosecuting crime, and the system, which is dependent on citizen
participation, would function less effectively as a result." Welling, Victims in the Criminal
Process: A Utilitarian Analysis of Victim Participation in the Charging Decision, 30 ARIz. L.
REV. 85, 92 (1988).
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applicability to particular cases, thus performing functions
traditionally exercised by courts.... 136
Professor Vorenberg has pointed out additional troubling ramifications
associated with unfettered discretion. According to him, discretion
hides malfunctions in the criminal justice system and avoids
difficult policy judgments by giving the appearance that they
do not have to be made. It obscures the need for additional
resources and makes misapplication of available resources
more likely.... Discretionary decision-making has helped
keep cases moving through the system without too many em-
barrassing questions, while promoting the impression that
compassion and wisdom are at work. The result has been
some compassion (often matched or exceeded by unfairness)
and very little wisdom. 137
B. Discretion as a Necessary Evil
While it is clear that undue refusals to charge have a negative
impact on the system, it is equally apparent that discretion plays an
important and perhaps indispensable role in the contemporary admin-
istration of justice. 138 The notion that full enforcement of the criminal
law is possible is now roundly discredited. Many cases entering the
system are either too insignificant or lacking in evidentiary merit to
warrant the expenditure of scarce system resources. 139 Moreover, in
practical terms, the sheer volume of potential criminal cases today is
simply too great and the resources available too few to allow for any-
thing approaching full enforcement.140 Discretion, in essence, is a nec-
essary evil that enables the criminal justice system to enforce the crim-
inal law.
136. Note, Reviewability of Prosecutorial Discretion: Failure to Prosecute, 75 COLUM.
L. REV. 130, 130 (1975) (footnote omitted).
137. Vorenberg, Narrowing the Discretion of Criminal Justice Officials, 1976 DuKE
L.J. 651, 652.
138. See Mellon, Jacoby & Brewer, The Prosecutor Constrained by His Environment:
A New Look at Discretionary Justice in the United States, 72 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
52, 53 (1981) ("Discretion is an essential component of the American system of criminal
justice. It is the element that makes the system uniquely American-the flexible and indi-
vidualized treatment of persons accused of crimes..."). Indeed, the facts of the Connors
case itself arguably present a good example of the necessity of discretion. There, several
members of the Green Bay Packers professional football team allegedly assaulted a female
dancer in the dressing room of a nightclub. If a trial were to have occurred, and sufficient
evidence to convict were lacking, the highly charged trial would have damaged reputations
and consumed considerable resources-all to no avail.
139. See Vorenberg, Decent Restraint of Prosecutorial Power, 94 HARV. L. REV. 152 1,
1547 (1981).
140. According to Professor McDonald:
For almost a century it has been beyond the capacity of urban court systems to give
every case its day in court. Faced with the prospect of an ever-increasing discrepancy
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Discretion is necessary for reasons other than its role in conserving
resources. Discretion protects citizens from the excessive breadth or
antiquated nature of the substantive criminal law. Not all laws currently
on the books are realistically intended to be enforced. 141 Discretion is
also necessary to individualize justice and to mitigate criminal sanc-
tions that under certain circumstances may be unduly harsh. If discre-
tion were not present and violations administered in "strict accordance
with rules of law, precisely and narrowly laid down, the criminal law
would be ordered but intolerable."' 142 Such individualization arises in
instances when an accused cooperates in the apprehension or convic-
tion of others; when strict enforcement would cause harm to the of-
fender in undue proportion to the harm of the crime; when not pros-
ecuting the offender would assist in achievement of other enforcement
goals; or when there is the possibility of prosecution by another juris-
diction. 143
Finally, discretion is inevitable because of the "open texture" of
the law.' 44 This view, forwarded most notably by Professor Kenneth
C. Davis, holds that the law and legislatures are inherently unable to
predict and take into consideration the innumerable situations that
might merit legal control. For this reason, society requires individuals
to evaluate situations and decide whether and to what degree the laws
shall apply.
145
C. Wisconsin Controls on the Prosecution Decision
Wisconsin Statutes section 967.05 provides that there are three
methods of commencing a criminal prosecution: by an information,
between caseloads and trial capacity, crime commissions since the 1920s have re-
peatedly recommended that prosecutors' offices inaugurate vigorous early screening
programs.
McDonald, Prosecutors, Courts, and Police: Some Constraints on the Police Chief Executive,
in POLICE LEADERSHIP IN AMERICA 205-06 (W. Gellered ed. 1985). See also Vorenberg, supra
note 139, at, 1548-49.
141. LaFave, The Prosecutor's Discretion in the United States, 18 AM. J. oF COMP.
L. 532, 533 (1970). According to Lezak and Leonard, "laws are often passed which reflect
the ideals of the community rather than a realistic expectation of conformity." Lezak &
Leonard, The Prosecutor's Discretion: Out of the Closet-Not Out of Control, 63 OR. L. REV.
247, 248 (1984). See also T. ARNOLD, THE SYMBOLS OF GOVERNMENT 160 (1935): "Most
unenforced criminal laws survive in order to satisfy moral obligations to established modes
of conduct. They are unenforced because we want to continue our conduct, and unrepealed
because we want to preserve our morals"). Examples of such enactments are Sunday "blue
laws," gambling laws, etc.
142. Breitel, Controls in Criminal Law Enforcement, 27 U. CHI. L. REv. 427 (1960);
see also ABA STANDARDS, supra note 58, at Standard 3-3.9 Commentary: "The public interest
is best served and evenhanded justice best dispensed not by the mechanical application of
the 'letter of the law,' but by a flexible and individualized application of its norms through
the exercise of a prosecutor's thoughtful discretion."
143. See ABA STANDARDS, supra note 58, at Standard 3-3.9.
144. See H. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (1961).
145. See K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 15-21 (1969).
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an indictment or a complaint. The most common method is by means
of a criminal complaint. 146 Complaints themselves may be issued by
three means. The first two are contained in section 968.02. Under this
section, a complaint may be issued either by the district attorney or,
if she is unavailable or refuses to do so, by a circuit judge.' 4 7 Alter-
natively, section 968.26, the John Doe statute considered in Unnamed
Defendant, may be used. 4 '
In an effort to determine the relative frequency of use of the above
procedures, an informal survey of district attorney offices was under-
taken. Personnel in offices in the Wisconsin counties of Milwaukee,
Brown (Green Bay), Oneida (Rhinelander), Dane (Madison) and Eau
Claire were interviewed. These interviews revealed that by far the most
common means of complaint issuance is by section 968.02(1), whereby
alleged criminal behavior comes to the attention of the prosecutor who
accepts or declines the case. 149 As for section 968.02(3), which allows
a court to issue a complaint in the event of prosecutor declination or
absence, interviews indicate that the mechanism has been used very
rarely in its twenty-year existence. 150 The John Doe statute, section
968.26, has been used with greater frequency but still far less than
section 968.02(1), and even then only in an "investigatory" and co-
operative capacity with the district attorney.''
In the event that a citizen is dissatisfied with a district attorney's
decision not to prosecute, little recourse exists other than sections
968.26 and 968.02(3).152 As noted earlier, since the late 1800s Wiscon-
146. See B. BROWN, THE WISCONSIN DISTRICT ATTORNEY AND THE CRIMINAL CASE
47 (1977). Wis. STAT. § 967.05(1)(b) (1989-1990) provides that if the defendant is a corpo-
ration, the prosecution is commenced by the filing of an information. Under other circum-
stances, an indictment handed down by a grand jury may commence a prosecution. Wis.
STAT. § 968.01(2) (1989-1990) defines a complaint as "a written statement of the essential
facts constituting the offense charged. A person may make a complaint on information and
belief." Wis. STAT. § 967.05(2),(3) (1989-1990) provides that if the crime involved is a mis-
demeanor, any trial is on the basis of a complaint, while if a felony, trial is on an information.
147. WIs. STAT. § 968.02(1), (3) (1989-1990).
148. See supra note 15.
149. Conversation transcripts on file with author.
150. Id. An identical finding was made by Miller in his American Bar Foundation
work in Wisconsin. See F. MILLER, supra note 76, at 158-59 ("there is no expectation that,
in the normal pattern of events, someone else's judgment will be substituted").
151. See supra note 107.
152. See supra notes 13 & 15. In addition to these avenues, state law allows for
prosecutions by persons other than the district attorney in certain limited and quasi-criminal
circumstances. E.g., WIS. STAT. § 23.65 (1989-1990) (allows a circuit court to file a complaint
if the prosecutor refuses or is unavailable and there is probable cause to believe that suspect
has violated Wis. STATS. §§ 159.07 (land disposal and incineration), 159.08 (yard waste),
159.81 (littering) or chs. 23 (conservation), 26 (forest lands), 27 (parks), 28 (public forests),
29 (fish and game), 30 (navigable waters, harbors, and navigation), 31 (dams and bridges) or
350 (snowmobiles)); Wis. STAT. § 79.04(2) (1989-1990) (if prosecutor refuses to order an
inquest, the circuit court, upon petition of a coroner or medical examiner, may issue the
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sin has disallowed private prosecution of alleged criminal behavior by
counsel retained by citizens. 153 This deference by the courts to the
publicly elected office of the prosecutor has been extended to preclude
private counsel from even assisting district attorneys in prosecutions. 5 4
In addition, barring extreme exigent circumstances, the attorney general
has no say in the charging decision 155 and charging, seen as inherently
discretionary, is not compellable in mandamus. 156 The principle means
of controlling district attorneys, then, are the strictures of equal pro-
tection, threat of suspension by the governor upon a finding of just
cause, scrutiny by the press and threat of political defeat in general
election or recall.' 57 In reality, however, these controls are more imag-
inary than real because the officials wielding the controls are either
reluctant or unable to invoke them. 58 Moreover, because charging
decisions are essentially invisible, taking place in great volume deep
within the confines of local offices, the public is ill-equipped to assess
prosecutorial practices. ' 59 Thus, in ultimate terms, the individual com-
plainant in Wisconsin has little recourse in response to unjustified pro-
secutorial inaction.
D. Federal and State Controls on the Prosecution Decision
The federal courts have exhibited a marked reluctance to interfere
with the prosecutor's discretion to prosecute.' 60 A principal rationale
order if it finds that the prosecutor has abused his discretion in not ordering an inquest);
WIs. STAT. §§ 5.08, 11.61(2), 19.51(1)(a), 767.65(12), (18)(c), (38)(b) (1989-1990) (allow state
department of justice to act if prosecutor does not with regard to certain violations); Wis.
STAT. § 19.97(4) (1989-1990) (if prosecutor fails to enforce the open meeting law within 20
days after receiving a verified complaint, the complainant may bring an action on behalf of
the state and get reasonable attorney fees if she prevails).
153. Biemel v. State, 71 Wis. 444, 37 N.W. 244 (1888).
154. Rock v. Eckern, 162 Wis. 291, 156 N.W. 197 (1916).
155. See F. MILLER, supra note 76, at 325-27.
156. State ex rel. Kurkierewicz v. Cannon, 42 Wis. 2d 368, 166 N.W.2d 255 (1969).
157. Connors, 136 Wis. 2d at 140-41, 401 N.W.2d at 791-92; Wis. STAT. § 17.11
(1989-1990) provides for removal by the governor. See supra note 7, discussing constitutional
expectations regarding affirmative decisions to charge.
158. See F. MILLER, supra note 76, at 293-96.
159. See K. DAvis, supra note 145, at 207-08:
[The prosecutor] is usually an elected official, and the theory is that he is responsible
to the electorate. The reality is that nearly all his decisions to prosecute or not to
prosecute ... and nearly all his reasons for decision are carefully kept secret, so that
review by the electorate is nonexistent except for the occasional case that happens
to be publicized. The plain fact is that more than nine-tenths of local prosecutors'
decisions are supervised or reviewed by no one.
See also Quinlan, The District Attorney, 5 MARQ. L. REV. 190, 194 (1921) (voters are unlikely
to provide diligent check on prosecutors' discretion).
160. See, e.g., Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 608 (1985) (describing the federal
courts as "properly hesitant to examine the decision whether to prosecute"); Inmates of Attica
Correctional Facility v. Rockefeller, 477 F.2d 375 (2d Cir. 1973) (discussion of judicial re-
luctance to review charging decisions).
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for this deference is the belief that involvement of the judiciary in the
charging decision would violate separation of powers doctrine.161 Sep-
aration of powers concerns also have been used by the federal courts
to deny mandamus as a means to compel prosecutions 162 and to deny
judicial review of prosecutorial decisions. 163
A second basis used by the federal courts to justify the discretion
given prosecutors is the perceived need to maintain flexibility to allow
effective use of limited resources and to achieve individualized jus-
tice.164 According to this view, prosecutors need significant flexibility
to screen out weak cases and effectively individualize justice in accord
with the diverse circumstances surrounding criminal behavior.
A third reason federal courts have used to justify their eschewal
of involvement in prosecutorial decisionmaking is that such involve-
ment, particularly judicial review, would involve prohibitive "systemic
costs."',65 Second-guessing of prosecutors would overtax the already
overburdened criminal justice system. 166
Similar deference is manifest among the states. Many state laws
require that district attorneys institute prosecutions against all crimes167
and others expressly allow prosecutors to exercise discretion in deciding
which cases to prosecute.168 As a general rule, the decision whether to
prosecute rests entirely within the discretion of public prosecutors, sub-
ject to modification only upon a showing of constitutional wrongdo-
ing. 169
As in Wisconsin, little recourse is available to citizens unhappy
161. See, e.g., United States v. Torquato, 602 F.2d 564, 569 (3d Cir. 1979) ("The
concept of separation of powers underlies the courts' concern that the prosecutorial function
be relatively untrammelled"); Attica, 477 F.2d at 379 ("The primary ground upon which this
traditional aversion to compelling prosecutions has been based is the separation of powers
doctrine").
162. Powell v. Katzenbach, 359 F.2d 234 (D.C. Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 906
(1966), reh'g denied, 384 U.S. 967 (1968).
163. United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167, 171 (5th Cir. 1965).
164. Spillman v. United States, 413 F.2d 527, 530 (9th Cir. 1969) ("The United States
Attorney must be given wide latitude in order to effectively enforce the federal criminal
laws"). See generally ABA STANDARDS, supra note 58, Standard 3-3.9 Commentary.
165. Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985).
166. Id.
167. See, e.g., 16 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1402 (Purdon 1987); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 15.725(1) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1985).
168. See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE § 26500 (West 1987) ("The public prosecutor shall
attend the courts, and within his or her discretion shall initiate and conduct on behalf of the
people all prosecutions...").
169. See supra note 7. See also State v. Murphy, 113 Ariz. 416, 555 P.2d 1110 (1976)
("The duty and discretion to conduct prosecutions for public offenses rests with the county
attorney. Generally, the courts have no power to interfere with the discretion of the prosecutor
unless he is acting illegally or in excess of his powers"); State v. McMahon, 183 N.J. Super.
97, 443 A.2d 258 (1981) (no interference absent bad faith, arbitrariness or gross abuse of
discretion); In re Padget, 678 P.2d 870 (Wyo. 1984) (holding unconstitutional a statute that
required court upon "satisfactory proof' to require prosecutor to file information).
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over a prosecutor's decision not to pursue a prosecution. District at-
torneys may be removed by courts, governors and legislatures. 70 Sim-
ilarly, in a number of jurisdictions the state attorney general and the
district attorney have concurrent jurisdiction to conduct criminal ac-
tions, 171 or the attorney general may supercede the local prosecutor at
the request of the governor. 1 72 However, all such occurrences are
rare.' 73 Where grand juries are used, disappointed complainants gen-
erally may not attempt to prompt prosecution by means of the grand
jury. Moreover, because charging decisions are seen as being inherently
discretionary, mandamus is generally not available to compel prose-
cution by a district attorney absent a showing of bad faith or corruption
on the prosecutor's part. 174 As in Wisconsin, public opinion is looked
to by most states as the principal hedge against prosecutorial abuse,
but such control is modest absent outrageous prosecutorial miscon-
duct. 75
In a few states, however, some recourse does exist. While the great
majority of states do not allow private prosecution, a small number
provide for a limited form of private prosecution. 176 A few others allow
some form of judicial review whereby a court may order a prosecutor
to proceed with a previously declined prosecution' 77 or allow for the
170. See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 36-1-9, 16 (1984); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3.08
(Baldwin 1990) (judicial removal); N.Y. CONST. art. 13, § 13 (McKinney 1987) (gubernatorial
removal). See generally Note, Private Prosecution: A Remedy for District Attorneys' Unwar-
ranted Inaction, 65 YALE L.J. 209, 212 (1955) (noting that such occurrences are rare).
171. See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12550 (Deering 1980); NEB. REV. STAT. § 84-204
(1987) (giving the attorney general power to supervise local prosecutors).
172. See, e.g., W. VA. CODE § 5-3-2 (1990).
173. See generally Note, supra note 170, at 212 ("This method of restraint merely
places the ultimate opportunity for action with other, busier, more remote officials").
174. Smith v. Superior Court, 101 Ariz. 559, 442 P.2d 123 (1967); Taliaferro v. Locke,
182 Cal. App. 752, 6 Cal. Reptr. 813 (1960); Hennebry v. Hoy, 343 N.W.2d 87 (N.D. 1983).
But see Hamstead v. Dostert, 313 S.E.2d 409 (W. Va. 1984) (state law allows citizen to petition
court for writ of mandamus if prosecutor abuses discretion in not prosecuting); Graham v.
Gaither, 140 Md. 330, 117 A. 858 (1922) (mandamus might be available against police officer
who corruptly refuses to enforce a law).
175. See Note, supra note 170, at 213.
176. See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 1409 (Purdon 1956) ("[the court] may direct
any private counsel employed by [complainant] to conduct the entire proceeding"); State v.
Rollins, 129 N.H. 684, 533 A.2d 331 (1987) (allows initiation and prosecution of certain
criminal complaints by private attorneys subject to the nolle prosequi powers of the attorney
general or prosecuting attorney); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-6-2 (Supp. 1990) (allowing private
prosecution for "cohabitant" abuse).
177. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS § 767.41 (1990) (prosecutor must provide reasons
for refusing prosecution in writing; if court is not "satisfied with the statement [of reasons
for declining prosecution], the prosecuting attorney shall be directed by the court to file the
proper information and bring the case to trial"), interpreted in Genesee County Prosecutor
v. Genesee Circuit Judge, 391 Mich. 115, 121, 215 N.W.2d 145, 147 (1974) (The court "may
not properly substitute its judgment for that of the ... prosecuting attorney .. " The judge
may reverse or revise a prosecutor's decision only if it appears on the record that the decision
constitutes an abuse of discretion); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-1606 (1989) (prosecutor must
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appointment of a special prosecutor. 178 Others allow for appeal to the
state attorney general. 179
V. WHY THE CURRENT CHECK IS INAPPROPRIATE
The power of the prosecutor to refuse prosecution is an essential
but potentially abused aspect of the justice system. A check on the
discretion of Wisconsin prosecutors is needed, especially because Wis-
provide written reasons for declining prosecution; if court not "satisfied with the statement,"
it shall direct the county attorney to file the proper information and bring the case to trial);
COLO. REV. STAT. 16-5-209 (1990) ("If after a hearing the judge finds that the refusal... to
prosecute was arbitrary or capricious and without reasonable excuse, he may order the pros-
ecuting attorney to file an information and prosecute the case.. ."), construed in Tooley v.
District Court, 190 Colo. 468, 549 P.2d 772 (1976) (court may not reverse prosecutor's
decision absent "clear and convincing evidence" that the decision was arbitrary or capricious);
PA. R. CiUM. P. 133(b)(2) (Purdon 1989) (attorney for the commonwealth "shall state the
reasons [for prosecution refusals] on the complaint form and return it to the affiant. Thereafter
the affiant may file the complaint with a judge... for approval or disapproval..."), construed
in Com. v. Benz, 523 Pa. 203, 209-10, 565 A.2d 764, 768 (1989) (court may review prosecutor's
decision not to file complaint if this decision is based on assessment that there is insufficient
evidence to establish a prima facie case; however, the court may not review any decision not
to prosecute based on prosecutorial "policy"). The latter Pennsylvania judicial review process
has been construed to require the application of a "gross abuse of discretion" standard of
review; see Com. v. Eisemann, 276 Pa. Super. 543, 419 A.2d 591, 593 (1980). In 1984, the
Wyoming Supreme Court invalidated for separation of powers reasons Wyo. STAT. § 7-6-
110 (1977), which provided that if the trial court were not satisfied with a prosecutor's stated
reason for inaction, "the county attorney shall be directed by the court to file the information
and bring the case to trial." In re Padget, 678 P.2d 870 (Wyo. 1984).
178. ALA. CODE § 12-17-186 (1986) ("when the district attorney refuses to act, [the
court] may appoint [a] competent attorney to act in such district attorney's place"); MiNN.
STAT. § 388.12 (1968 & Supp. 1986) (court may appoint an attorney to serve "as, or in the
place of" the county attorney), construed in State ex. rel. Wild v. Otis, 257 N.W.2d 361, 365
(Minn. 1977) ("Arguably, a private citizen could petition the district court for action pursuant
to this statute and the court could appoint a special prosecutor if it decided that this was
necessary"); N.D. CENT. CODE § 11-16-06 (1985) (if court finds that "state's attorney has
refused or neglected to perform" it may request the attorney general to prosecute or appoint
another "attorney to take charge of" the action); COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-5-209 (1990) ("If
after a hearing the judge finds that the refusal of the prosecuting attorney to prosecute was
arbitrary or capricious and without reasonable excuse, he may order the prosecuting attorney
to file an information and prosecute the case or may appoint a special prosecutor to do so");
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 1409 (Purdon 1956) ("If any district attorney shall neglect or refuse
to prosecute ... [the court] may direct any private counsel employed by such prosecutor to
conduct the entire proceeding"); Wyo. STAT. § 9-1-805 (1987) (permits the court to direct
or permit any member of the bar to act in place of the district attorney when the latter is
interested or refuses to act), construed in In re Padget, 678 P.2d 870 (Wyo. 1984); UTAH
CONST. art. 8, § 16 (court may appoint special prosecutor if prosecutor fails or refuses to
prosecute); TENN. CONST. art. 6, § 5 (same).
179. See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 8-5-3 (1983) (upon failure or refusal of prosecutor
to act, attorney general may pursue the matter if deemed advisable and governor directs the
investigation); MINN. STAT. § 8.01 (1977) (upon governor's written request, attorney general
shall represent the state and exercise the powers of the county attorney), construed in State
ex rel. Wild v. Otis, 257 N.W.2d 361 (1977) (citizen may appeal to governor, who then might
order the attorney general to prosecute the case).
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consin law disallows alternate means of redress in the form of
mandamus 8 ° or private prosecution. ' 8' Moreover, as discussed earlier,
the traditional means thought to control prosecutorial abuses-threat
of not being reelected, press scrutiny and removal from office-are more
theoretical than real.182
While the current check provided for in Wisconsin Statutes section
968.02(3) is a step in the right direction, it is also clear that the overall
charging approach upheld by the Unnamed Defendant court is not the
answer. Other than the constitutional flaws discussed earlier, numerous
practical reasons militate against the continued use of the checks ap-
proved by the Unnamed Defendant court.
The first shortcoming in the current controls is that both sections
968.02(3) and 968.26 permit a de novo determination by the court as
to whether a complaint should issue. Such an approach is an anomaly
in the nation and is problematic for the considerable potential strain
it will impose on the courts. 8 3 While the statutes have heretofore been
used sparingly, 18 4 there is no assurance that the same will continue,
given the notoriety of Connors and Unnamed Defendant and the grow-
ing popularity of victims' rights.
The second and more troubling shortcoming is the requirement
in both statutes that courts use the minimal legal evidentiary standard
of probable cause. A strict reading of the statutes dictates that a com-
plaint must be issued if a court finds probable cause to charge a suspect
with a crime.' 85
The use of the probable cause charging standard is problematic
for a number of reasons. The first is of a practical nature and is well-
illustrated by a recent West Virginia case, State ex rel. Hamstead v.
Dostert.i8 6 In Hamstead, the state's supreme court held in dicta that a
private citizen may use a writ of mandamus to compel a reluctant
prosecutor to charge a suspect if probable cause is found to exist.8 7 In
a stinging opinion, Justice Neely criticized the use of the charging stan-
180. State ex rel. Kurkierewicz v. Cannon, 42 Wis. 2d 368, 166 N.W.2d 255 (1969).
181. Biemel v. State, 71 Wis. 444, 37 N.W. 244 (1888).
182. See supra notes 157-59 and accompanying text.
183. See Note, supra note 136, at 139 ("De novo review is not favored, because it
would place a great burden on the time and energies of the courts... ); see also Inmates of
Attica Correctional Facility v. Rockefeller, 477 F.2d 375, 380-81 (2d Cir. 1973); 5 U.S.C. §
706 (Administrative Procedures Act disallows de novo review of discretionary determina-
tions).
184. See supra notes 149-51 and accompanying text.
185. Unnamed Defendant, 150 Wis. 2d 352, 367-68, 441 N.W.2d 696, 702 (Heffernan,
C.J., concurring) ("Both of the statutes validated herein make it possible for persons to trigger
the prosecutorial powers of the state in any kind of criminal action where 'probable cause'
can be established").
186. 313 S.E.2d 409 (W.Va. 1984).
187. Id. at 415-16.
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dard as "potentially disastrous as a matter of policy ... burden[ing]
the courts with responsibility for listening to unfounded charges from
every self-appointed guardian of the public interest in criminal pros-
ecutions."I 8 According to Justice Neely, the central flaw in the court's
reasoning was its use of the evidentiary minimum of probable cause
as the end-all of charging: "It is elementary logic that a mandatory
standard of omission does not imply that in the reverse situation there
is a mandatory standard of commission."18 9
This sentiment is directly apposite to Wisconsin's current charging
situation. The Unnamed Defendant court endorsed a system that ef-
fectively reduces charging, an intrinsically fact-intensive judgment rife
with policy considerations, to a formulaic decision based solely on the
probable cause standard. This outcome, as noted by Chief Justice Hef-
fernan in Unnamed Defendant, makes for a situation in which
[n]o consistent prosecutorial policy in respect to the initiation
of charges can be maintained.... The de facto standard for
prosecuting attorneys is, in the experience of this writer, but
for the exceptional case, not to invoke the awesome power of
the state unless the crime in all likelihood can be proved
beyond a reasonable doubt. Our imprimatur upon these stat-
utes may well give a gloss that runs counter to the legislative
intent of Wisconsin's criminal law reforms. 190
Ultimately, as noted by Chief Justice Heffernan, the low charging
threshold potentially opens the way for abuses by persons with im-
proper motives seeking to have enemies prosecuted: "Both of the stat-
utes.., make it possible for persons to trigger the prosecutorial powers
of the state in any kind of criminal action where 'probable cause' can
be established."' 191 Such a situation can only be seen as counterpro-
ductive in light of Wisconsin's early and sustained concern over a
system of public prosecution.
In addition to the illogical, impractical effect of using the probable
cause standard, there is the fundamental conflict it poses with prose-
cutorial ethics. For decades Wisconsin prosecutors have embraced as
188. Id. at 425 (Neely, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
189. Id. at 420. See also U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL PROSE-
CUTION 5 (1980) [hereinafter PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL PROSECUTION] ("[Probable cause] is,
of course a threshold consideration only. Merely because this requirement can be met in a
given case does not automatically warrant prosecution...").
190. Unnamed Defendant, 150 Wis. 2d at 367, 441 N.W.2d at 702 (Heffernan, C.J.,
concurring).
191. Id. at 367, 441 N.W.2d at 702 (Heffernan, C.J., concurring); see also Inmates of
Attica Correctional Facility v. Rockefeller, 477 F.2d 375 (2d Cir. 1973) ("Such interference
with the normal operations of criminal investigations ... based solely upon allegations of
criminal conduct, raises serious questions of potential abuse by persons seeking to have other
persons prosecuted ... ").
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accepted wisdom that prosecution is not merited without a reasonable
expectation of conviction at trial. 192 Given this, prosecutors are faced
with what amounts to a Hobson's choice: they must charge if probable
cause exists but may not charge unless there is a reasonable expectation
of conviction. Thus, in cases in which they have probable cause, but
not sufficient evidence to convict, prosecutors will necessarily violate
one of their duties.
Finally, the current approach embodied in sections 968.26 and
968.02(3) is problematic for its implicit notion that full enforcement
of the criminal law is desirable and capable of being achieved. Theo-
retically, with the lower charging standard, all arrests or alleged vio-
lations otherwise brought to the attention of prosecutors would be pros-
ecuted-and justifiably so. This would prevent, in Justice Steinmetz's
words, situations wherein "the district attorney takes the role of pros-
ecutor and jury."' 93 In truth, however, if prosecutors were required to
prosecute whenever the bare charging minimum of probable cause ex-
isted, enormous caseload increases would occur and suspects for whom
the state lacked evidence to convict would suffer incalculable damages
in reputation and expense.194 That full enforcement is beyond the ca-
pacity of the system is illustrated by the recently enacted "pro-prose-
cution" policy in Dane County regarding domestic abuse. 195 Prelimi-
nary figures indicate a huge clogging of the courts caused by the
enforcement policy regarding this offense alone. 196
VI. A PROPOSAL
As discussed, an avenue is needed for victim redress in the event
of undue prosecutorial inaction. As Justice Abrahamson observed in
192. See, e.g., 7 Op. Att'y Gen. 178 (1918); Thompson v. State, 61 Wis. 2d 325, 330,
212 N.W.2d 109, 111 (1973). This standard is also common throughout the nation. See F.
MILLER supra note 76, at 32; ABA STANDARDS, supra note 58, at Standard 3-3.9; U.S.
ATTORNEY'S MANUAL 9-27.220 (1984); Baker, The Prosecutor-Initiation of Prosecution, 23
Am. INST. CRIM. LAW & CRIMINOLOGY 770, 785 (1933).
193. Connors, 136 Wis. 2d at 154, 401 N.W.2d at 797 (Steinmetz, J., dissenting).
Implicit in the Justice's view is the idea that the courts might somehow screen cases with
greater consistency and effectiveness. The notion that the courts screen cases more effectively
than prosecutors is belied by Donald McIntyre's experience in Chicago where judges formerly
screened with rates very similar to those of prosecutors elsewhere. See McIntyre, Judicial
Dominance of Charging Practice, 59 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 468, 490 (1968).
194. As noted by the United States Department of Justice: "[B]oth as a matter of
fundamental fairness and in the interest of the efficient administration of justice, no prose-
cution should be initiated against any person unless the government believes that the person
probably will be found guilty by an unbiased trier of fact." See PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL
PROSECUTION, supra note 189, at 6. Similarly, another commentator observes a more prag-
matic ramification: "Judicial compulsion of prosecution of all known violators might create
equity in prosecution, but the resulting prosecutions would be less effective." Note, supra
note 136, at 144.
195. WIs. STAT. § 968.075 (1989-1990).
196. See Harris, Abuse Cases Clog the Courts, Wis. St. J., April 18, 1988, at Cl, col. 1.
1730
1990:1695 A Proposed Check on Charging Discretion 1731
Connors, the question facing Wisconsin is not whether the legislature
is empowered to control the discretion of the district attorney at the
charging stage. The legislature is so empowered. 197 Rather, the question
is "whether to provide a forum, and if so what kind of forum, in which
the prosecutor's decision not to charge a person suspected of having
committed a crime may be challenged and overturned."' 198
The challenge in establishing a fair means of initiating criminal
prosecutions is clear: to provide a system that at once allows prosecutors
sufficient flexibility to do their jobs effectively, yet also provides a check
on discretion that will guard against its inappropriate exercise. 199 The
multi-faceted reform approach suggested here is directed toward sat-
isfying these demands.
A. The Use of Guidelines and Declination Reasons
Executive rule-making, a process whereby prosecutors' offices pro-
mulgate prosecution guidelines and disciplinary measures for them-
selves, has gained increasing popularity in recent years. The approach
has been adopted by the federal government,200 numerous localities, 20 1
and the American Bar Association (ABA), among other advisory
groups. 20 2 Indeed, numerous local prosecutors offices within Wisconsin
197. See supra note 125.
198. Connors, 136 Wis. 2d at 151, 401 N.W.2d at 796.
199. See State v. Karpinski, 92 Wis. 2d 599, 608, 285 N.W.2d 729, 735 (1979) ("In
the criminal justice system there is at one and the same time the need for encouraging
prosecutorial discretion to achieve flexibility and sensitivity and the need for circumscribing
prosecutorial discretion to avoid arbitrary, discriminatory or oppressive results").
In this endeavor, a delicate balance must be struck. As recognized by Lezak and Leon-
ard, "[a] blanket revision of a system of compulsory prosecution, when practicalities permit
only selective enforcement, would drive discretion underground and stifle attempts to control
and channel its use." Lezak & Leonard, The Prosecutor's Discretion: Out of the Closet-Not
Out of Control, 63 OR. L. REv. 247, 257 (1984). Other recent commentators express this
restraint from a more pragmatic perspective:
This is not to suggest that prosecutorial discretion can or should be abolished. The
multifarious situations confronting the prosecutor from day to day all cannot be
anticipated or resolved in advance. Further, certain decisions properly fall within
the unique technical expertise of the prosecutor and are properly made by him. But
absolute discretion in determining whom to charge and selecting which laws to
enforce is undesirable because it tends to become a tool to achieve expediency at
the expense of justice.
Bubany & Skillern, Taming the Dragon: An Administrative Law for Prosecutorial Decision
Making, 13 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 473, 494-95 (1976).
200. See PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL PROSECUTION, supra note 189, at 2-3.
201. See Vorenberg, supra note 137, at 680.
202. See ABA STANDARDS, supra note 58, at Standard 3-2.5; see also THE COURTS,
supra note 130, at Standard 1.2; NATIONAL PROSECUTION STANDARDS, Standard 8.1 (Nat'l
Dist. Attorneys Ass'n 1977).
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itself have adopted internal charging guidelines. 20 3 This practice should
be required of all local prosecutors' offices in the state.
The advantages of formulating internal rules to guide prosecution
decisions are manifold. Principally, the use of rules compels rationality
and consistency in prosecutors' charging practices. The process of rule-
making itself injects a consciousness into an otherwise frequently re-
flexive act, promoting an ongoing reassessment of office actions.2°
Moreover, rules allow for accountability once prosecution decisions are
made20 5 and promote public confidence as citizens are able to scrutinize
the avowed policies and practices of their prosecutors' offices. 20 6
The development of any meaningful criteria in such an inherently
subjective area is difficult. The ABA in its Standards for Criminal Jus-
tice Relating to the Prosecution Function notes that "[b]y its very nature,
the exercise of discretion cannot be reduced to a formula. Nevertheless,
certain guidelines for the exercise of discretion should be estab-
lished." 207 Recent years have witnessed numerous attempts to for-
mulate guidelines to structure charging discretion. The ABA provided
perhaps the most widely acknowledged:
The prosecutor is not obliged to present all charges which the
evidence might support. The prosecutor may in some circum-
stances and for good cause consistent with the public interest
decline to prosecute, notwithstanding that sufficient evidence
may exist which would support a conviction. Illustrative of
the factors which a prosecutor may properly consider in ex-
ercising his or her discretion are:
(i) the prosecutor's reasonable doubt that the accused
is in fact guilty;...
(iii) the disproportion of the authorized punishment
in relation to the particular offense or the offender;
(iv) possible improper motives of a complainant;
(v) reluctance of the victim to testify;
203. See Wis. LEcIS. COUNCIL, STAFF BULL. 83-1, at 18 (1982). In construing these
guidelines the Wisconsin Supreme Court has applied a "rational basis" test, looking to see
if the charging policy "is based on justifiable and reasonable considerations." Locklear v.
State, 86 Wis. 2d 602, 613, 273 N.W.2d 339, 338 (1979).
204. See Vorenberg, supra note 3, at 1545 ("Self-imposed limits on discretion may
have greater force than either their detractors or creators realize. As they acquire greater
visibility, they may become part of the popular climate and professional culture in which
prosecutors work").
205. See infra notes 236-38 and accompanying text.
206. For a discussion of whether dissemination of guidelines may lessen the deterrent
effects of the law, see Rabin, Agency Criminal Referrals in the Federal System: An Empirical
Study of Prosecutorial Discretion, 24 STAN. L. REV. 1036, 1076-77 (1972); Abrams, Internal
Policy. Guiding the Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion, 19 UCLA L. REV. 1, 25-34 (1971).
207. See ABA STANDARDS, supra note 58, at Standard 3-3.9 Commentary.
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(vi) cooperation of the accused in the apprehension
or conviction of others; and
(vii) availability and likelihood of prosecution by an-
other jurisdiction.2 08
Other, perhaps more helpful approaches have been of a more specific
nature, including those concerning the nature of the offense and of-
fender; the personal characteristics of the defendant; considerations of
the purposes and demands of the criminal justice system; and evidence
sufficiency. 20 9
The development of these guidelines among Wisconsin prosecu-
tors should take place at the local level, as opposed to being imposed
by the legislature or another state-wide body. This approach is en-
couraged by the ABA and other commentators.210 Joan Jacoby argues
that such an approach is sensible because district attorneys are elected
officials who are uniquely suited to adopt practices that "reflect the
attitudes and policies of [their] constituents."'2 1 "Since the prosecutor
is a result of the local political process," writes Jacoby, "his policy
about enforcement of the law should reflect the opinions of the com-
munity at large."2 2 The internal development of guidelines is also
preferable because such guidelines have a greater chance of being rec-
ognized and followed by local prosecutors.2 13
In tandem with guidelines, all prosecutors' offices should be re-
quired to implement a system whereby prosecutors in each instance of
refused prosecution provide a written record specifying why prosecu-
tion was declined. 214 The procedure is beneficial as it encourages pros-
ecutors to consider each case carefully in the context of the prosecution
208. Id. at Standard 3-3.9; see also NATIONAL PROSECUTION STANDARDS, supra note
202, at Standard 8.2; PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL PROSECUTION, supra note 189, at 5-15.
209. See Thomas & Fitch, Prosecutorial Decision Making, 13 AM. CRIM. L. REv.
507, 518-22 (1976). For an insightful analysis of excessive generality in guidelines, see Com-
ment, Justice Department's Prosecution Guidelines of Little Value to State and Local Pros-
ecutors, 72 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 955 (1981).
210. See ABA STANDARDS, supra note 58, at Standard 3-3.9 Commentary ("The
instant standard is not intended to be a substitute for developing appropriate prosecution
policies on a local level"); id. at Standard 3-3.4(c). ("The prosecutor should establish standards
and procedures for evaluating complaints to determine whether criminal proceedings should
be instituted").
211. Jacoby, The Charging Policies of Prosecutors, in THE PROSECUTOR 75, 77 (W.
McDonald ed. 1979).
212. Id. at 78. Jacoby adopts this view for other reasons as well. Under these cir-
cumstances, the local prosecutor serves as a "dynamic" element in the criminal law, in
contrast to the cumbersome legislative process of change, allowing "changes in public policy
to come into effect and be tested." Id. at 77.
213. See Lezak & Leonard, supra note 199, at 263.
214. Ironically, Wisconsin for many years had a similar practice codified at WiS.
STAT. § 955.17, only with respect to the filing of informations. See supra note 47. Currently,
the states of Michigan and Nebraska require the provision of written declination reasons;
see supra note 177. The approach was also endorsed by the National Advisory Commission
on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals in the early 1970s; see supra note 130, at 3.
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guidelines.21 5 Moreover, the provision of declination reasons will allow
victims to learn why their case was refused, thereby lessening the pros-
pect of alientation among citizens in the prosecution process.
The development of guidelines and the requirement that reasons
for negative charging decisions be provided is significant for yet another
reason-it will facilitate judicial review of prosecutors' decisions, the
cornerstone of the control mechanism advocated in this Comment. The
lack of any record for the reviewing court to examine has, in the past,
served as a principal reason to avoid the review of prosecutors' deci-
sions.216
B. The Use of Judicial Review
Traditionally shunned as an affront to separation of powers doc-
trine,217 judicial review is assuming increasing popularity today as a
discretion control measure.21 s Most notably, the process was looked
upon favorably by the Wisconsin Supreme Court in Connors and Un-
named Defendant as an alternative to the current charging approach.
In his concurring opinion in Unnamed Defendant, Chief Justice Hef-
fernan stated:
The writer is not unmindful of the predicament of a victim
of a crime who is afforded no relief by a recalcitrant prose-
cutor. It would appear, however, that this situation might
better be alleviated by legislative approval of a limited judicial
review of a prosecutor's declination to prosecute.219
215. Comment, Prosecutorial Discretion in the Initiation of Criminal Complaints, 42
S. CAL. L. REV. 519, 543 (1969).
216. See, e.g., Inmates of Attica Correctional Facility v. Rockefeller, 477 F.2d 375,
380 (2d Cir. 1973) ("In the absence of statutorily defined standards governing reviewability,
or regulatory or statutory policies of prosecution, the problems inherent in the task of su-
pervising prosecutorial decisions do not lend themselves to resolution by the judiciary").
217. See supra note 163 and accompanying text.
218. See supra note 177. The notion that separation of powers precludes review is
increasingly being discredited. Professor Kenneth Davis notes that:
If separation of powers prevents review of discretion of executive officers, then more
than a hundred Supreme Court decisions spread over a century and three-quarters
will have to be found contrary to the Constitution! If courts could not interfere with
abuse of discretion by executive officers, our fundamental institutions would be
altogether different from what they are.., the courts would be powerless to interfere
when executive officers, acting illegally, are about to execute an innocent person!
K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 210 (1969). But see Abrams,
supra note 206, at 52 (author cautions that the "ready availability of judicial review could
interfere with the rapid development of the desired type of internal controls").
219. Unnamed Defendant, 150 Wis. 2d at 368, 441 N.W.2d at 702 (Heffernan, C.J.,
concurring). See also supra note 177 for examples of other states employing judicial review
in the event of prosecutorial inaction.
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Many practical reasons justify judicial review, but two in particular
stand out. First, review allows aggrieved parties an opportunity to ob-
tain reconsideration of a non-prosecution decision of a district attor-
ney.220 Such a safety valve is essential in the name of fairness to victims
and the overarching concern for fostering trust in the justice system.
As noted by Justice Steinmetz in Connors: "Allowing a review of [the
prosecutor's] decision, even if the decision is affirmed, by a member
of the judiciary promotes trust in the legal system."22 Second, review
will also benefit prosecutors. A judicial ratification of a decision not to
prosecute may eliminate any unfounded complaints against prosecutors
and diminish suspicions that inevitably attach to cloistered deci-
sions. 222
The approach also has appeal for its consistency with traditional
Wisconsin notions of separation of powers. Historically, Wisconsin case
law has seen the district attorney as a "quasi-judicial officer," engaged
in a sharing of responsibility with the courts to assure that justice is
fairly and efficiently done.223 The judiciary already serves as a check
on the executive powers of prosecutors at numerous points in the crim-
inal justice process. Wisconsin Statutes section 970.03 provides that at
a preliminary hearing the circuit court must review the state's case as
presented by the prosecutor and determine whether sufficient probable
cause exists to believe a crime has been committed.224 Only then may
a defendant be bound over for trial.2 Similarly, if a prosecutor wishes
to dismiss a case after it has been judicially certified for trial she must
first receive court approval.226 Moreover, Wisconsin law provides nu-
merous statutes characterized by a sharing of responsibility between
220. See J. MASHOW & R. MERRILL, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw: THE AMERICAN PUBLIC
LAw SYSTEM 269 (2d ed. 1985) ("The central value of judicial review may be its residual
guarantee of justice in individual cases. From this perspective judicial review protects the
citizen from the extremes of bureaucratic tunnel vision or incompetence...").
221. Connors, 136 Wis. 2d at 153, 401 N.W.2d at 797 (Steinmetz, J., dissenting).
222. Bubany & Skillern, supra note 199, at 505.
223. State v. Washington, 83 Wis. 2d 808, 816-17, 266 N.W.2d 597, 601-02 (1978);
Loose v. State, 120 Wis. 115, 130, 97 N.W.2d 526, 531 (1903) ("The legislature... has spoken
intending to leave the prosecuting officer to exercise the administrative authority mentioned
[on selection of appropriate charges].... That authority is doubtless not unlimited. It cannot
be arbitrarily exercised. The trial court must necessarily have supervisory control over it so
as to prevent any manifest abuse thereof'). See also Cox, Prosecutorial Discretion: An Over-
view, 13 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 383, 397 (1976) ("Acceptance of some judicial review results in
an interpretation of separation of powers more consistent with its original intent; that is, that
separation of powers implies a limit to discretion and was not intended to prevent review
of discretionary acts").
224. WIs. STAT. § 970.03(1) (1989-1990); State v. Hooper, 101 Wis. 2d 517, 533-34,
305 N.W.2d 110, 118-19 (1981).
225. WIs. STAT. § 970.03(7) (1989-1990).
226. State v. Kenyon, 85 Wis. 2d 36, 45, 270 N.W.2d 160, 164 (1978) ("Prosecutorial
discretion to terminate a pending prosecution in Wisconsin is subject to the independent
authority of the trial court to grant or refuse a motion to dismiss 'in the public interest' ").
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the executive and the judiciary in the administration of justice.227 The
ABA itself endorses such a "sharing" approach:
There are sound general policy reasons that argue for the joint
screening of cases by both the prosecutor and the magistrate.
The prosecutor brings trial experience, continuity in office,
and the perspective of public responsibility to bear on a de-
cision. Beyond this, the sharing of responsibility in the de-
cision whether to prosecute is an important application of
'checks and balances' to the field of prosecution.228
Ultimately, judicial review is consonant with separation of powers prin-
ciples. As noted by Professor Vorenberg, "[riather than displacing pro-
secutorial judgment, [judicial] review merely requires prosecutors to
state how they will employ their judgment and holds them to those
statements.
229
C. Judicial Standard of Review
With the adoption of judicial review, a standard must exist to
facilitate review. The standard chosen must be flexible enough to allow
complainants latitude to challenge inaction yet be sufficiently defer-
ential to deter frivolous actions and preserve the necessary autonomy
of the district attorney. An unduly restrictive standard of review might
encourage a prosecutor to minimize the exercise of discretion or, at a
minimum, limit the visibility of that exercise. As noted by one com-
mentator:
If decisions not to bring criminal prosecutions were subject
to overly strict review, the quality of mercy which tempers
the justice of the criminal law may be lost since the prospect
of being overruled may influence prosecutors to disregard the
subjective factors which may prompt decisions not to exact
the law's full measure. 230
Given these criteria, an "abuse of discretion" standard would ap-
pear most appropriate. The NACCJSG has endorsed the abuse standard
227. See, e.g., WIS. STAT. § 967.055(2)(a) (1989-1990) (drunk driving statute requires
judicial supervision to amend or dismiss charges). See also supra note 107 (discussing the
"sharing" of duties common to "John Doe" investigations pursuant to Wis. STAT. § 968.26
(1989-1990)).
228. See ABA STANDARDS, supra note 58, at Standard 3-3.4 Commentary.
229. See Vorenberg, supra note 3, at 1571. See also In re Piscanio, 235 Pa. Super.
490, 494-95, 344 A.2d 658, 661 (1975), where a Pennsylvania court found a similar justifi-
cation for the judicial review process codified at PA. R. CRiM. P. 133(b)(2): "[the rule] protects
the interests of the private complainant by allowing for the submission of the disapproved
complaint to a judge.... The judge's independent review of the complaint checks and bal-
ances the district attorney's decision and further hedges against possibility of error."
230. See Note, supra note 135, at 143.
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in times of prosecutorial inaction.231 More importantly, the standard
is a familiar one in Wisconsin jurisprudence. Traditionally, reviewing
courts have used the standard to assess general discretionary decisions
by lower courts,232 to examine the propriety of John Doe investigations
in particular 233 and to review post-preliminary hearing charging deci-
sions by prosecutors.234 In addition, Wisconsin statutory law provides
that the standard is to be employed by courts in the review of district
attorney refusals to order medical inquests.235
With the standard in place, the question that next arises is what
criteria the courts should use when assessing whether prosecutors
abused their discretion in refusing to institute criminal proceedings. 236
In this context, the local prosecutors' rules and recording of declination
reasons assume prime importance. On these bases, the reviewing court
would consider whether the inaction was premised on the standards
and policies of the office or was motivated by extraneous or unreason-
able factors. The court would need to be particularly attentive to sit-
uations in which there is some reason to believe that race, sex, religion,
political affiliation or the personal sentiments of the prosecutor played
a role in the decision not to prosecute.237 Similarly, the potential that
the fact-finder(s) will likely acquit because of some unpopular factor
in the state's case or because of the popularity of the accused should
not be deemed reasonable bases for declination. 238 An abuse would
exist only when the court discovered a departure from standards and
policies without appropriate reason.
Consistent with current judicial review practices among Wisconsin
courts, judges reviewing prosecutors' decisions would consult the re-
cord in its entirety to decide whether an abuse of discretion had oc-
curred.239 Also, consistent with case law, the reviewing court would
231. See NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION, supra note 130, at Standard 1.2. But cf
supra note 177 (describing differing judicial standards of review).
232. See, e.g., In re Johnson, 9 Wis. 2d 65, 100 N.W.2d 383 (1960) (where discretion
is conferred upon trial court, appellate court is not to reverse unless record demonstrates
that there has been clear abuse of discretion).
233. State ex rel. Niedziejko v. Coffey, 22 Wis. 2d 392, 401, 402, 126 N.W.2d 96,
101 (1964).
234. State v. Hooper, 101 Wis. 2d 517, 305 N.W.2d 110 (1981).
235. WIs. STAT. § 979.04(2) (1989-1990) provides that the circuit court, upon the
petition of a coroner or medical examiner, may issue the order if it finds that the district
attorney has abused his discretion in not ordering an inquest.
236. In Hooper, the court held that it is an abuse of discretion for a prosecutor to
institute criminal proceedings when evidence is clearly insufficient to merit conviction. 101
Wis. 2d at 538, 305 N.W.2d at 121. However, there is no Wisconsin law on standards to
evaluate discretionary abuse in instances of prosecutorial refusal to institute proceedings.
237. See PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL PROSECUTION, supra note 189, at 14.
238. Id.
239. See, e.g., In re Guardianship of Schmidt, 71 Wis. 2d 317, 237 N.W.2d 919 (1976)
(supreme court may review record in its entirety in deciding whether trial court has abused
its discretion).
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uphold the discretionary decision of the prosecutor if there were facts
of record that would reasonably support such a decision pursuant to
the articulated charging guidelines.24
D. The Procedure
Because of the serious nature of criminal charges, any challenge
to a prosecutor's decision not to charge should not be approached
lightly. To minimize the potential threat of harassment and vindictive
actions, and yet provide victims a form of redress in times of prose-
cutorial inaction, the charging mechanism proposed here requires the
satisfaction of strict standing requirements. To this end, only those
persons241 suffering an injury in fact 24 2 would be eligible to challenge
a prosecutor's decision not to prosecute an alleged criminal event. 243
240. Maier Constr., Inc. v. Ryan, 81 Wis. 2d 463, 260 N.W.2d 700 (1978) (reviewing
court must uphold discretionary decision of the trial court if there are facts of record that
would support such a decision had it been made on the basis of those facts); Dunn v. Fred
A. Mikkelson, Inc., 88 Wis. 2d 369, 276 N.W.2d 748 (1979) (reviewing court does not take
independent review as it would where there is a claim of legal error and, instead, will affirm
discretionary order if there appears to be any reasonable basis for trial court's decision);
Rhodes v. Terry, 91 Wis. 2d 165, 280 N.W.2d 248 (1979) (reviewing court will not find abuse
of discretion if record shows that discretion was in fact exercised and if record shows that
there is reasonable basis for trial court's determination); Schumacher v. Schumacher, 131
Wis. 2d 332, 388 N.W.2d 912 (1986) (supreme court will sustain discretionary act of trial
court if court examined relevant facts, applied proper standard of law and, using demonstrated
rational process, reached conclusion that reasonable judge could reach).
241. WIs. STAT. § 967.05(l)(b) (1989-1990) provides that prosecutions involving cor-
porations are commenced by the filing of informations, rather than complaints, which is the
typical means for individuals. Because this proposal seeks to refine only the complaint-
issuance process, prosecutions involving corporate entities are beyond its scope.
242. The jurisdiction of Wisconsin courts, unlike their federal counterparts, is not
bound by the necessity of a "case or controversy." However, standing doctrine is adaptable
to the situation here. A complainant would need to show that he or she was within the "zone
of interests" and suffered an "injury in fact." See, e.g., Association of Data Processing Serv.
Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 152-53 (1970).
In Michigan, a crime victim is one who "suffers direct or threatened physical, financial,
or emotional harm as a result of the commission of a crime." MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. §
780.752(g)(i) (West Supp. 1990). The Florida constitutional amendment, discussed at supra
note 5, provides that the "next of kin of homicide victims" are to be treated as victims for
the purposes of the amendment. This would seem an appropriate expansion of the otherwise
limited standing requirement.
243. The United States Supreme Court itself has spoken to the issue of victim stand-
ing in actions to compel prosecution. In Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614 (1973), the
Court refused to endorse an action brought by the mother of an illegitimate child seeking to
compel the prosecution of the child's putative father to provide support payments. According
to the Court, "in American jurisprudence at least, a private citizen lacks a judicially cognizable
interest in the prosecution or nonprosecution of another." Id. at 619. While apparently an-
nouncing a per se preclusion of victim standing, the language of the Court later in the opinion
softened this stance. This particular victim lacked standing due to "an insufficient showing
of a direct nexus between the vindication of her interest and the enforcement of the State's
criminal laws." Id. See also Leeke v. Timmerman, 454 U.S. 83 (1981) (Court refused to grant
standing to parties seeking to have arrest warrants issued because "questionable nexus"
existed between parties' injuries and defendants' conduct).
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Thus, so-called "victimless" crimes would be beyond the purview of
the proposed approach. 244
In due deference to the preeminent role of the executive in the
charging decision, the proposal also envisions an exhaustion require-
ment.245 Under all circumstances a complainant must first approach
the local district attorney to request prosecution; only after prosecution
is refused may a victim seek redress from the courts. 246 In the event
a prosecutor declines to prosecute, justification for this decision must
be provided in writing and must be based on an articulable office policy.
This decision and its attendant rationale must then be provided to the
prospective complainant. The latter would then have a right to appeal
to an internal review committee contained within the office of the local
prosecutor.247 If the committee confirms the decision of the individual
244. To allow such prosecutions would run too great a risk of circumventing a central
tenet of standing doctrine, viz., to preclude the use of the court to litigate "ideological" or
"political" causes. For instance, a citizen upset over the government's failure to prosecute
violations of a paraphernalia law would not be allowed to challenge prosecutorial inaction.
Such a citizen's views would be more appropriately expressed via political avenues, rather
than through the criminal law. But see Note, supra note 170, at 232 (suggesting private
prosecution scheme that would allow private prosecution of victimless crimes "upon a show-
ing that the crime threatens public confidence in law and order, or undermines the integrity
of governmental institutions").
245. This concept is borrowed from administrative law and was described by the
Wisconsin Supreme Court in Wisconsin Collectors Association v. Thorp Finance Corp.:" 'Ex-
haustion' applies where a claim is cognizable in the first instance by an administrative agency
alone; judicial interference is withheld until the administrative process has run its course."
32 Wis. 2d 36, 47, 145 N.W.2d 33, 38 (1966) (citation omitted). The requirement also provides
the court with the prosecutors' expertise and, under the circumstances advocated here, pro-
vides a factual record for review. This would preempt a common problem noted by the
United States Supreme Court: "[J]udicial review may be hindered by the failure of the litigant
to allow the agency to make a factual record or to exercise its discretion or to apply its
expertise." McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 194 (1969).
246. This requirement is consistent with the views of the ABA; see ABA STANDARD,
supra note 58, at Standard 3-3.4(d) ("Where the law permits a citizen to complain directly
to a judicial officer.., the citizen complainant should be required to present the complaint
for prior approval to the prosecutor, and the prosecutor's action or recommendation thereon
should be communicated to the judicial officer...").
247. Ideally, this committee would be comprised of senior prosecutors, individuals
seasoned in prosecutorial decision making. The creation and use of such a committee would
have several benefits. First, it would allow victims to be heard in a less formal (and perhaps
less intimidating) setting than a court. Second, the expertise of prosecutors would be further
utilized, thereby perhaps obviating the need to expend scarce judicial resources in the review
process. Third, providing the executive with an opportunity to reconsider its prosecutorial
decision would be less disruptive of separation of powers principles-relative to disallowing
executive review prior to appeal by the victim to the judiciary. The author is indebted to
Professor Carin Clauss, University of Wisconsin Law School, for this insight.
An alternative process to the one outlined above might resemble the charging confer-
ence now used by the Milwaukee County Office of the District Attorney. Under that scheme
the charging attorney, victim(s), arresting officer and any witnesses to the alleged crime meet
to discuss the facts of the case. The district attorney reviews the facts and the preliminary
charge suggested by the arresting officer and subsequent to the meeting determines whether
the suspect is to be charged. If the victim is dissatisfied with the outcome, she is entitled to
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prosecutor, a victim would then bear the burden of approaching the
court.
If a victim with requisite standing wished to pursue the matter,
the reviewing court would, on the basis of the above-described criteria,
determine whether the prosecutor abused her discretion in declining
the case. To facilitate review, the court would summon the prosecutor
(or a representative) and the victim and then conduct a public pro-
ceeding on the merits of the complaint.248 If, after the meeting, the
court were dissatisfied with the prosecutor's decision, and the prose-
cutor persisted in not filing a complaint, the court would appoint a
special prosecutor to initiate prosecution. 249 Ideally, but not necessarily,
this appointee would be a prosecutor from another local office, sharing
similar discretionary skills. To minimize the threat of vindictive pros-
ecutions and to preserve the "quasi-judicial" role of the prosecutor, the
private attorney of a victim would not constitute a suitable prosecu-
torial appointee. 250 The exercise of this appointment power by the court
appeal to a senior district attorney. The latter will then review the file in the presence of the
victim and arresting officer. This information was provided by Greg O'Meara, assistant dis-
trict attorney and training director of the Milwaukee District Attorney's Office. Conversation
transcript on file with the author.
Obviously, neither of the above options would be viable in offices containing insufficient
numbers of prosecutors. Such offices should, to the extent possible, devise an analogous review
process on a local basis. The author is indebted to Professor Frank Remington, University
of Wisconsin Law School, for this insight.
248. The public nature of the proceeding is consonant with the democratic belief that
local district attorneys are elected by the people and hence should conduct their business
openly. This view was shared by the Wisconsin Supreme Court in an early interpretation of
WIS. STAT. § 968.02(3) (1989-1990) where the court held that the proceeding authorized by
that statute was presumptively open to the public. State ex rel. Newspapers, Inc. v. Circuit
Ct., 124 Wis. 2d 499, 513, 370 N.W.2d 209, 216 (1985). A closed proceeding would be
appropriate only when a "substantial, compelling reason" were shown. Id. at 501, 370 N.W.2d
at 211. This showing must be "based on articulable facts known to the court rather than
unsupported hypotheses or conjecture." Id. at 508, 370 N.W.2d at 214. The court provided
several factors that might justify closure: (1) the "salacious" nature of the evidence might
embarrass the parties or threaten the public interest, (2) the avoidance of harassment, intim-
idation, etc., either by other persons accused or the public, and (3) protection of the privacy
or reputational interests of the accused, if a criminal charge were not to result. Id.
249. See Wis. STAT. § 978.045(1) (1989-1990). This statute essentially recodifies Wis.
STAT. § 59.44 (repealed Jan. 1, 1990). It provides that in certain circumstances (lack of a
district attorney in a county, conflict of interest, absence, etc.) the court may "appoint some
suitable attorney" to act as district attorney for "the time being." Id. This statute, to date,
has been used by Wisconsin courts only with regard to refusals to prosecute in the context
of dismissals. See Guinther v. City of Milwaukee, 217 Wis. 334, 258 N.W. 865 (1935). As
noted earlier, see supra note 226 and accompanying text, the nolle prosequi powers of pros-
ecutors, unlike those relating to charging, have traditionally been subject to the supervision
of the courts. This difference notwithstanding, it appears that Wis. STAT. § 978.045(1) may
be appropriately used to appoint special prosecutors at the pre-charge juncture.
250. As noted in supra notes 59-61 and accompanying text, Wisconsin since the I 800s
has disallowed the use of private counsel in criminal prosecutions. See also Young v. United
States ex rel. Vuitton et FiS S.A., 481 U.S. 787 (1987). In Young, the Court construed the
constitutionality of a procedure within Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 42(b), which
courts had interpreted to allow judicial appointment of a private attorney to prosecute crim-
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would minimize encroachment by the judiciary on the executive: ul-
timately, another executive officer would reconsider the decision to
prosecute. 251
The question that next arises is what are to be the rights of appeal
among the respective parties. As for complainants, in the event that
the lower court endorsed the prosecutor's decision not to prosecute, a
complainant could appeal this decision to a higher court.252 Similarly,
if a district attorney were dissatisfied with a reviewing court's finding
that the initial refusal to prosecute constituted an abuse of discretion,
she would have a right to appeal. 253 The accused would be granted no
right to appeal at this stage; procedural safeguards at the preliminary
hearing and later in the proceedings are designed to protect such in-
terests.254
In essence, the mechanism suggested above is intended to replace
the current well-intended but ill-conceived review procedure contained
in Wisconsin Statutes section 969.02(3). There remains, however, the
potential de novo role of the circuit judge in the context of the John
Doe proceeding wherein the court may issue complaints if "it appears
probable from the testimony given that a crime has been committed
and who committed it.... 255
While found constitutional in Unnamed Defendant, the complaint
issuance aspect provided for in section 968.26 is anachronistic, 256 rarely
used2 57 and ultimately does not comport with contemporary separation
inal contempt proceedings. In the case at bar, the Court invalidated the Second Circuit's
practice of appointing the private counsel of the injunction's beneficiary to prosecute the
injunction's violation. According to the Court, such a practice ran the risk of allowing the
counsel, under the aegis of the state, to elevate his client's interests above those of the state
in achieving justice. Id. at 804-05. Moreover, the use of the interested party's attorney created
"an appearance of impropriety that diminishes faith in the fairness of the criminal justice
system in general." Id.
251. See In re Padget, 678 P.2d 870 (Wyo. 1984); Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654
(1988).
252. This safeguard was suggested by the Wisconsin Court of Appeals in Gavcus v.
Maroney, 127 Wis. 2d 69, 377 N.W.2d 200 (Ct. App. 1985). The state of Pennsylvania allows
a similar right of appeal. See PA. RULE CRIM. P. 133(B)(2) (Purdon 1989), construed in Com.
v. Muroski, 352 Pa. Super. 15, 506 A.2d 1312, 1314 (1986). However, in light of the financial
and emotional costs associated with such litigation it is unlikely that many complainants
would pursue further review.
253. While this right of appeal would exist in law, in reality it is unlikely that pros-
ecutors would appeal, given their natural desire as officers of the court to retain the judiciary's
good will.
254. The writer is cognizant of the disparity among the appeal rights discussed here
vis-i-vis defendants, the victim and the state. However, excessive procedural controls at this
early stage would likely lead to what Arthur Rosett calls "judicialization": the tendency for
each stage to assume the traits of a full-blown trial, making the process more expensive,
complex and time-consuming. Rosett, Discretion, Severity and Legality in Criminal Justice,
46 S. CAL. L. REV. 12, 19 (1972). This is an inherent threat with any system involving judicial
review and this threat should be minimized.
255. WIs. STAT. § 968.26 (1989-1990).
256. See supra notes 42-84 and accompanying text.
257. See supra notes 149-51 and accompanying text.
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of powers principles. 258 The ability of complainants, in technical terms,
to approach the court outside of the context of an investigative pro-
ceeding should be precluded. The legislature should modify section
968.26 to reflect the statute's contemporary usage-as an expedient in-
vestigatory alternative to the grand jury when the powers of the pros-
ecutor and the court are joined in a shared enterprise.2 59 Section 968.26
should be modified by the legislature to ensure that this approach is
the continued emphasis. To this end, in the event a John Doe judge
deems that a criminal complaint should issue in a given proceeding,
the judge should direct the district attorney to file the complaint.260
VII. CONCLUSION
Concern over the rights of victims in times of prosecutorial in-
action is justifiably and increasingly making its presence felt across the
country. In Unnamed Defendant, the Wisconsin Supreme Court ap-
proved of a system of checks over the largely unfettered discretion of
prosecutors in the charging decision. This Comment has examined
these little-used controls and found them inconsistent with separation
of powers principles and the realities of the modern justice system. An
alternative system of control has therefore been suggested, one which
incorporates executive rule-making, the requirement of a written record
in times of prosecutorial inaction and judicial review. Inevitably, such
a reform will entail an uncertain degree of systemic costs. However,
the check advocated here is designed to minimize such costs. Prose-
cutors would now have an incentive to regulate themselves to a much
258. See supra notes 106-27 and accompanying text.
259. This role of the John Doe has been predominant for some time. In State ex rel.
Long v. Keyes (1889), the Wisconsin Supreme Court related that "It]he main purpose [of
the John Doe] is to obtain the facts in relation to the offense from the complainant and other
witnesses...." 75 Wis. 288, 293 (1889). More recently, the supreme court in State v. Wash-
ington pointed out that "[t]he John Doe is, at its inception, not so much a procedure for the
determination of probable cause as it is an inquest for the discovery of crime in which the
judge has significant powers." State v. Washington, 83 Wis. 2d 808, 822, 266 N.W.2d 597,
604 (1978). See also Wolke v. Fleming, 24 Wis. 2d 606, 612, 129 N.W.2d 841 (1964); State
ex rel. Kurkierewicz v. Canon, 42 Wis. 2d 368, 376, 166 N.W.2d 255 (1969).
260. As noted by the Washington court, as a matter of practice district attorneys are
present in John Doe proceedings, but the statute does not mandate their presence: "It is usual
but not required that an attorney representing the state's interest in criminal prosecution be
involved both in initiation and conducting the proceedings. Sec. 968.26, Stats., does not
require the participation of the district attorney nor does it set forth the duties of the district
attorney." Washington, 83 Wis. 2d at 823 n.10, 266 N.W.2d at 605 n.10. This Comment is
intended to apply to the typical situation where the district attorney is present. The legislature
should consider recodifying the John Doe statute to require a member of the executive to
be present in the course of John Doe proceedings. (If the executive itself were the subject of
investigation special dispensation would be appropriate).
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greater extent than ever before. Moreover, any costs ultimately incurred
should be seen as a small price to pay for a charging system responsive
to the needs of Wisconsin's citizens.
WAYNE A. LOGAN

